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8 Abstract Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯ wrote several treatises on Advaita philosophy.
9 His magnum opus is the Advaitasiddhi, written in order to reply to the keen
10 objections moved by the Dvaitin Vya¯satı¯rtha’s Nyāyāmṛta. Advaitasiddhi is verily a
11 turning point into the galaxy of Veda¯nta, not only as far as its replies are concerned,
12 but also for the reutilization of earlier veda¯ntic material and its reformulation by
13 means of the highly sophisticated language of the new school of logic. This article is
14 an attempt to contextualize Madhusu¯dana’s works in a broader context through
15 three looking glasses: (1) the analysis of how Madhusu¯dana refers to his own works,
16 in order to reconstruct a relative chronology among them; (2) Madhusu¯dana’s
17 adherence to the tenets of the previous Advaita tradition, how much he is indebted
18 to Vya¯satı¯rtha, how he quotes him and how he replies to him; (3) Madhusu¯dana’s
19 acquaintance with other textual traditions, mainly Vya¯karan
˙
a, Pu¯rva Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ and
20 Nya¯ya.
21
22 Keywords Advaita Veda¯nta · Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯ · Advaitasiddhi ·
23 Reverse indebtedness · Vya¯satı¯rtha · Textual reuse
Abbreviations Not Contained in the Bibliography
24 PM Pramāṇamālā
25 BG Bhagavadgītā
26 BS Brahmasūtra
27 Br
˙
U Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
28 MS Madhusūdana Sarasvatī
29 LC Laghucandrikā
30 VT Vyāsa Tīrtha
31 SS´SS Saṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha
G. Pellegrini (&)
Department of Humanities, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
e-mail: gianni.pellegrini@unito.it
123
J Indian Philos
DOI 10.1007/s10781-014-9240-9
Journal : 10781 Dispatch : 5-7-2014 Pages : 58
Article No. : 9240 * LE * TYPESET
MS Code : i R CP R DISK
R
EV
IS
ED
PR
O
O
F
32 Structure and Finalities
33 This contribution deals with a philosophical network among philosophers, mainly
34 focusing on Advaita Veda¯nta as interpreted by one of the greatest ācāryas of the
35 pre-modern era: Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯ (hereafter MS). Through the looking glass
36 of his masterpiece, the Advaitasiddhi (hereafter AS) and his other minor works, I
37 shall try to work out a general understanding of how Advaita authors of that period
38 used diversified materials in their works.
39 In MS’s textual production there is a huge quantity of quotations, acknowledged
40 and not acknowledged references, hints and presuppositions. In this article I shall
41 highlight three layers of material used by MS:
42 (1) Cross-references: MS’s quotations, references and hints at his own works;
43 (2) Quotations from Advaita material: reference, defence, re-evaluation and
44 reformulation of earlier authors’ statements, adherence to the textual tradition
45 because quoting and referring to previous ācāryas strengthens one’s own
46 position;
47 (3) Other schools’ material: replies to the Dvaita Nyāyāmṛta and references
48 (acknowledged or unacknowledged) to texts or doctrines of other schools.
49
50 In the works of MS we easily feel his continuous attempt to interpret the efforts
51 of earlier Advaita ācāryas towards a common and unique aim, which is epitomized
52 in the title of his magnum opus: Advaitasiddhi. Apart from the first two sections of
53 this article, the rest of the analysis is thus especially focused on AS and his relation
54 with earlier sources. In order to better put in context MS’s works, the first section is
55 an introduction dedicated to drawing a preliminary sketch of the historical and
56 cultural period, beginning with the emergence of the Navya Nya¯ya style and its
57 capillary diffusion, the long lasting debate between Dvaita and Advaita,
58 Vya¯satı¯rtha’s (henceforth VT) utilization of navya style to demolish Advaita
59 positions, the consequent reply by MS and his adaptation of Advaita tenets to Navya
60 Nya¯ya technical terminology.
61 The second section is a survey on MS’s works (case (1) above). It attempts to
62 establish a relative chronology among them and investigate how MS used his own
63 writings in others works. One notices that MS rarely copied and pasted passages or
64 discussions from one text to another. If this happens, it is just in the earlier stages of his
65 production. Many discussions are repeated, when but their subject is the same.
66 However, whenever MS approaches some issue already treated elsewhere, he simply
67 cross-refers and, closing the parenthesis, sends the reader to his own other text. Even
68 when dealing with similar issues, there is a precise differentiating balance which leads
69 to implementing his discussion with ever new materials, discussions and vocabulary.
70 As pointed out by Torella (2011, pp. 178–179) concerning the various recipients of
71 Abhinavagupta’s Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti and Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivimarśinī,
72 MS’s works are different because of their different adhikārins.
73 The third section of this article is devoted to a rapid glance at Advaita literature
74 and MS’s extensive knowledge of it (case (2)). To discharge the previous ācāryas
75 from the objections of VT, MS is compelled to quote many passages by VT. In fact,
76 polemical texts like AS are constructed following an established pattern so that they
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77 are primarily focused on refuting opponents in extremely technical terms (this
78 constitutes a “reverse indebtedness”, see infra, Sect. IV.1). This, of course,
79 presupposes a great textual expertise on the part of the recipient of the text, because
80 the authors only give some clues about discussions held elsewhere and leave their
81 recollection to the scholarly background of the readers. The last section is a
82 rudimental attempt to show how much MS is acquainted with and how he re-uses
83 other śāstras (case (3)).
84 I will also attempt to show how the later Advaita way of referring and quoting is
85 apparently quite far from the modern concept of plagiarism.1 In AS we find many
86 features and expressive modalities shared with other śāstras, but expressed in
87 Veda¯ntic terms. For instance, we deal with verbatim quotations from Upaniṣads (see
88 UP), re-propositions verbatim and ad sensum of well-known Advaitic doctrines and
89 references from earlier ācāryas (see Conclusions).
90 I Contextualization
91 From the X–XI century onwards, Advaitins shifted their attention to a different
92 referent for their attacks and confutations, mainly the Naiya¯yikas and later on the
93 realist schools of Veda¯nta, whereas the previous adversaries like Sa¯m
˙
khyas and
94 Buddhists were just nominally inserted into the debates (Deshpande 1997, p. 460, n.
95 15). This trend is witnessed by texts of the calibre of Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya
96 (hereafter KKK) of S´rı¯hars
˙
a (XII century) and Tattvapradīpikā (or Citsukhī,
97 hereafter TP) of Citsukha Mun
˙
i (1220 ca., Potter 2006, p. 602; XIII CE, Sharma
98 1974, pp. 1–4; Divanji 1933, pp. CVIII–CX), which vehemently and sophisticatedly
99 questioned Naiya¯yikas’ positions.
100 The Dvaita school of Veda¯nta emerged between the XIII and the XIV century,
101 due to Madhva’s work (or A¯nanda Tı¯rtha, 1238-1317, Sharma 1981, pp. 77–79).2 In
102 his writings, in particular in his Anuvyākhyāna commentary on Brahmasūtra
103 (hereafter BS), Madhva vehemently addressed the Advaitins and their siddhāntas as
104 the main adversaries, consequently directing the dialectical dispute with the
105 Naiya¯yikas towards other frontiers. After Madhva comes an early stage of
106 development of dualist writings, culminating in the “standardization of Dvaita
107 thought” (Sharma 1981, p. 235) under the encyclopaedic genius of Jaya Tı¯rtha
108 (1365–1388, Sharma 1981, p. 245).3 This author won the title of ṭīkācārya for the
1 See, in this volume, Doctor (section 5.1) and Neri (Conclusions).
2 According to Dasgupta, who significantly anticipates the dates of this author, Madhva was born in 1197
(IV, 1991, p. 52). After entering saṃnyāsa, he became the head of the As
˙
t
˙
a Mat
˙
ha of Ud
˙
ipi. As ācārya of
Dvaita Veda¯nta, he focused his keen refutation of S´am
˙
kara and his direct disciples, Sures´vara (IX cen.)
and Padmapa¯da (IX cen.), as well as later important Advaita authors (Dasgupta 1991, p. 104) such as
Sarvajn˜a¯tman (between the end of the IX cen. and the beginning of the X cen.), Va¯caspati Mis´ra (X cen.)
and Vimukta¯tman (XI cen.).
3 Following Dasgupta (1991, pp. 93–94), Jaya Tı¯rtha was a disciple of Aks
˙
obhya Tı¯rtha (1230–1247),
pupil and successor of Padmana¯tha Tı¯rtha (after Narahari Tı¯rtha, 1204–1213, and Ma¯dhava Tı¯rtha, 1214–
1230), a direct disciple and head of the Mat
˙
ha after Madhva (1197–1204). Jaya Tı¯rtha headed the Mat
˙
ha
from 1247 to 1268.
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109 Nyāyasudhā, a highly sophisticated sub-commentary on Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna.4
110 In the fourth generation of disciples departing from Jaya Tı¯rtha comes Vya¯sa Tı¯rtha
111 (hereafter VT, 1478–1539)5 whose magnum opus, the Nyāyāmṛta (hereafter NA), is
112 undoubtedly one of the most outstanding treatises of the Indian philosophical
113 horizon. The Vis´is
˙
t
˙
a¯dvaita school of Veda¯nta was also widely present in the debate
114 with both the other schools, lasting from the XI to the XVIII century.
115 Let us now leave the Dvaita thinkers for a while and briefly glance at the new
116 linguistic and philosophical tendencies of that pre-modern period. In the Mithila¯
117 region a new (navya) methodologically precise way of expression arose. It was a
118 new rigorous philosophical style: the New Logic (Navya Nya¯ya), which was a
119 system of philosophical analysis arisen from the combination of Nya¯ya and
120 Vais´es
˙
ika. This school developed a technical language which became the standard
121 idiom for academic works in Sanskrit, not only in the systems of philosophy, but in
122 grammar, poetics and law. Even though the beginnings of this new school were
123 already visible in Udayana’s writings (X century), the truly innovative output has
124 been assumed to be in Gan˙ges´a Upa¯dhya¯ya’s (1320, Potter et al. 1993, pp. 85–86;
125 XIII century, Ingalls 1988, pp. 4–6; 1325, Matilal 1977, p. 105) Tattvacintāmaṇi
126 (hereafter TC). Although in the period separating Udayana and Gan˙ges´a6 the
127 process by which the new logic penetrated the usage of other systems was slow, it
128 was nevertheless inexorable. In fact, it caught the entire Indian philosophical
129 panorama within the span of two or three centuries, becoming an essential tool of
130 precision in both written and oral debates. Having tested the important and
131 innovative accomplishments of the logicians, all the other systems were obliged to
132 adjust their formulation to this kind of idiom. The adoption of Navya Nya¯ya
133 terminology in the late pre-modern Indian philosophy provided a new common
134 conceptual vocabulary, so that the debaters became able to mutually understand
135 each other. This process continued in the traditional training of Sanskrit scholars.
136 Bronkhorst et al. (2013)7 recently have tried to identify the point in which the
137 navya style penetrated the scholarly tradition of Va¯ra¯n
˙
ası¯. According to their
138 research it seems that in the early years of the formation of Navya Nya¯ya, precisely
139 from Gan˙ges´a to Paks
˙
adhara (alias Jayadeva) Mis´ra (last part of the XV century,
4 Sharma (1981, p. 252) refers to the views quoted and refuted by Jaya Tı¯rtha in the Nyāyasudhā, where
S´an˙kara’s, Bha¯skara’s, Ra¯ma¯nuja’s and Ya¯davapraka¯s´a’s commentaries on BS were subject to severe
criticism. Even the sub-commentators were not spared, like Padmapa¯da, Va¯caspati, Praka¯s´a¯tman (XI CE;
Divanji 1933, pp. CVII–CVIII) and Amala¯nanda Sarasvatı¯ (XIII cen.), author of Kalpataru, a gloss on
Va¯caspati’s Bhāmatī. Jaya Tı¯rtha attacks also Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, Tattvabindu, Nyāyakusumañjalī,
Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, Tattvapradīpikā, Mānamanohara, Nyāyalīlāvatī,
Gan˙ges´a, Bhasarvajn˜a, Pras´astapa¯da, S´rı¯dhara’s Nyāyakandalī, Vyomas´iva, Kuma¯rila and Prabha¯kara
as well as the sphoṭavādins. It is likely that Vidya¯ran
˙
ya (XIV cen.) and Jaya Tı¯rtha’s guru, Aks
˙
obhya
Tı¯rtha, were contemporaries, meaning Jaya Tı¯rtha was slightly younger than Vidya¯ran
˙
ya. There are also
some textual evidences according to which they met (Sharma 1981, pp. 248–249).
5 The date accepted here is the one proposed by Sharma (1981, p. 286), one of the leading scholars of
Dvaita Veda¯nta. Again Sharma (1981, p. 237) quotes a verse from Śrīmuṣṇamāhātmya, where Madhva,
Jaya Tı¯rtha and Vya¯sa Tı¯rtha bearing the title munitraya are said to be the utmost authorities of Dvaita
Veda¯nta. According to Deepak Sharma, Vya¯sa Tı¯rtha’s birth can be placed 18 years before: 1460–1539
(2003, p. 17).
6 For further details see Bhattacharya (1987, pp. 1–7).
7 I would like to thank Professor Bronkhorst for sending me his article before its publication.
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140 Kaviraj 1961, p. 35; Ingalls 1988, pp. 6–9), the technical language of Navya Nya¯ya
141 remained confined to Mithila¯ where the indigenous paṇḍitas monopolized its
142 teaching and transmission so as to secure their undisputed leadership on it
143 (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 73–75).8 But, this jealous attitude towards navya
144 language and methodology contrasts with its spread all over India.9 In order to
145 answer to this oddity, the three scholars affirm that “broadly speaking, it looks as if
146 the journey of Navya-Nya¯ya techniques from Mithila¯ to Varanasi” passed through
147 Vijayanagara.10 VT lived as royal preceptor in Vijayanagara, first hosted by the
148 Sa¯l
˙
uva dynasty (1485–1505) and, later, by the Tul
˙
uva dynasty (1505–1570).11
149 Controversies between Dvatins and Advatins occupy a pivotal position in the
150 history of Indian philosophy. VT’s NA has been considered the most colossal attack
151 to the very basis of Advaita, such as the notions of avidyā, of superimposition
152 (adhyāsa), falsity of the world (mithyātva), etc. In its four chapters, while clearly
153 presenting the opponents views, VT shows his deep learning in all the śāstras:
154 beside Nya¯ya and various schools of Veda¯nta, he was particularly proficient in
155 Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, Vya¯karan
˙
a as well as Vedic “philology”. To each and every Advaitins’
156 position he replies using a highly sophisticated Navya Naiya¯yika style, pointing out
157 all the weaknesses, shortcomings and fallacies of his adversaries. NA seriously
158 mined the entire doctrinal building of kevalādvaitavāda (Gupta 2006, pp. 11–12).
159 After NA’s ponderous attack on Advaita the Advaitadīpika and Bhedadikkāra of
160 Narasim
˙
ha¯s´rama or Nr
˙
sim
˙
ha¯s´rama (middle of the XVI century; NC, Sastri-Sastri
161 1959, pp. 47–48) or Appayya Dı¯ks
˙
ita’s Mādhvamatavidhvaṃsana with its own
162 commentary Mādhvamatamukhamardana or Mādhvamatamukhabhaṅga (Sharma
8 The above-mentioned scholars quote an interesting, even if partially unsupported, note of Kaviraj
(1961, p. 36, n. 5), which suggests the attitude of Mithila¯ towards Navya Nya¯ya. According to Kaviraj, the
manuscripts of Nya¯ya works produced in Mithila¯ were not allowed to leave the city or to be copied. Thus
the “students had to commit text to memory” and later on were examined by their teachers. He adds that,
since the expertise and diploma gained from Mithila¯ were guarantees of pan-Indian recognition, a lot of
students used to go there to learn the new techniques (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 73–74).
9 It is important to specify that this “confinement” of Navya Nya¯ya lasted until the arrival in Mithila¯ of
the Bengali Raghuna¯tha S´iroman
˙
i (ca. 1510), whose effort greatly helped the new logic to spread also in
its second centre, Navadvı¯pa in Western Bengal (Potter and Bhattacharya 1993, pp. 3–4). However, the
possible link made by Sharma (1981, pp. 291–926) between VT and Va¯sudeva Sarvabhauma (1430–1530,
Bhattacharya 1976, p. 81), whose commentary on the Laks
˙
mı¯dhara Kavi’s Advaitamakaranda was
probably sent for criticism to Vijayanagara after the Kalin˙ga war (1516), is also quite interesting.
Va¯sudeva Sarvabhauma was initially a Navya Naiya¯yika disciple of Paks
˙
adhara (Jayadeva) Mis´ra
(Kaviraj 1961, p. 51) in Mithila¯. Later he shifted to Navadvı¯pa, where he founded a traditional school (ṭol)
(Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 80–81) and probably became the guru of Raghuna¯tha. Therefore, he seems to
be the real founder of the Bengali Navya Nya¯ya tradition (Bhattacharya 1976, p. 81). Subsequently,
Va¯sudeva became an Advaitin and then a follower of Caitanya (Potter and Bhattacharya 1993, p. 4).
10 It is a matter of fact that VT was acquainted with a number of texts from Mithila¯, but it is not at all
clear in which way he got this knowledge. Following Somana¯tha’s hagiography of VT, the
Vyāsayogicarita, Bronkhorst et al. offer some hypothetical solutions (2013, pp. 78–79). See also Sharma
(1981, pp. 291–296).
11 Clarks (2006, pp. 193–202) deals with the different religious orientation of the Vijayanagara rulers,
during the kingdom of the three dynasties, which succeeded each other from the traditional foundation of
the city (1336): the San˙gama (1336–1486), then the Sa¯l
˙
uva and the Tul
˙
uva. The San˙gama were closely
connected with the S´r
˙
n˙gerı¯ maṭha and especially with Bha¯ratı¯ Tı¯rtha and Ma¯dhava Vidya¯ran
˙
ya
(Minkowski 2011, p. 219). VT received the highest reputation during the reign of the Tul
˙
uva
Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
adevara¯ya.
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163 1981, pp. 86–87, 387; Minkowski 2011, p. 210) are still pale attempts to defend the
164 system. By contrast, the most successful defence of Advaita positions has
165 undoubtedly been the AS (Nair 1990, pp. 20–21; Gupta 2006, pp. 11–12). As
166 noted by Minkowski (2011, pp. 212–213), the very tough criticism forced the
167 Advaitins to weaken the rigid separation among the opinions internal to Advaita,
168 perhaps clearly explaining them in anthological compendiums like Appayya
169 Dı¯ks
˙
ita’s Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha (hereafter SLS, see also infra, Sect. III.2). It is
170 possible to assume that “Advaita was rearticulated to become once again the meta-
171 discourse of Indian philosophy, and at the same time to represent the mainstream or
172 properly Vedic view” (Minkowski 2011, p. 223). Thus, with Appayya, MS and then
173 Dharmara¯ja Adhvarin, a new harmonizing spirit originated among the several
174 branches of Advaita. At the same time, the diffusion of the navya style compelled
175 the Advaitins to reformulate their tenets with a new idiom.
176 This was the intellectual and, consequently, textual panorama in which MS found
177 himself. AS, his magnum opus, is highly technical.12 This text is the result of
178 Advaitins’ need to reply to the keen objections moved by the Dvaitin VT’s NA to
179 the very doctrinal structure of Advaita. Within the long sequence of propositions
180 and oppositions, which occupied the internal discussion between many schools of
181 Veda¯nta for at least seven or eight centuries, the AS is verily a turning point.
182 The importance of MS and his AS is witnessed by the rapidity and vehemence of
183 the reactions it provoked (Freschi’s Introduction, Sect. 4.3; Preisendanz 2008, pp.
184 611–612): a full series of texts is based on the NA-AS polemics (Nair 1990, pp. 21–
185 24).
186 II MS Refers to His Own Works
187 II.1 MS
188 Already in the century preceding the appearance of MS there were several signs of a
189 renewed cultural vigour. The liberal Afghan Muslim ruler of Gaud
˙
a, Alauddin
190 Hussain Shah (1493–1519), greatly patronized learning and the sciences. In this
191 period Nima¯i Pan
˙
d
˙
ita was born, subsequently better known as S´rı¯kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a Caitanya
192 (1486–1533/4), founder of the acintyabhedābhedavāda current of Vais
˙
n
˙
avism, who
193 enormously influenced the Bengali vaiṣṇava thought. In 1575, Akbar (1556–1605)
194 defeated Daud Karrani, the last Afghan ruler and included Bengal in his Mughal
195 kingdom, where he left his army chief Mansingh as governor. This also was a period
196 of splendour for Bengal because, along with economic development, the magna-
197 nimity of the Mughal king allowed a free religious cult. Caitanya’s movement had a
198 broad echo and stimulated Bengali people to undertake pilgrimages to distant
199 tīrthas, such as Mathura¯-Vr
˙
nda¯vana, Jaganna¯tha Puri, Ka¯s´ı¯, etc. MS was born and
12 A less known but decidedly appealing study of M.M. A¯nantakr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a S´a¯strı¯ covering a whole issue of
Sarasvatı¯ Sus
˙
ama¯ (1964, pp. 83–178), the journal of the Sanskrit University of Varanasi, discusses
Advaitasiddheḥ śāṃkaravedānte kiṃ sthānam? This long monographic article is devoted to the disclosure
of AS as a defence of Advaita tenets and an extremely precise survey on all its literature.
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200 raised in this period of political stability and great economic, cultural and religious
201 mobility (Saha 2011, pp. 16–18).
202 It is quite a tough task to determine with a consistent grade of certitude the life of
203 MS, since one has to cope with hagiographical and contradictory information. It
204 seems quite likely that MS was born in Eastern Bengal (in the village Kot
˙
a¯lipa¯d
˙
a¯ in
205 the district of Faridpur, now Bangladesh). Several scholars have proposed their own
206 ideas concerning the floruit of MS (ca. 1500–1607?) or solutions for his terminus
207 ante quem and terminus post quem. The most plausible and extensive discussion is
208 found in Divanji (1933, pp. I–XXIX), who evaluates all the earlier attempts and to
209 whom nearly all the later authors refer.13 It is accepted that at the early stages of his
210 life MS was known by the birth name Kamalanayana (Divanji 1933, p. XVII). Most
211 probably, MS was a student of the Navya Nya¯ya school of Navadvı¯pa, founded by
212 Va¯sudeva Sarvabhauma and strengthened by Raghuna¯tha. MS apprehended the
213 navya techniques by Harira¯ma Tarkava¯gı¯s´a (according to Gambhirananda [1998, p.
214 14] he learned Navya Nya¯ya with Mathura¯na¯tha Tarkava¯gı¯s´a [1550]), probably a
215 pupil of Raghuna¯tha himself (Kaviraj 1961, p. 60).14 This Navya Naiya¯yika might
216 be the S´rı¯ra¯ma mentioned in the second maṅgala verse of AS and in the closing
217 verse of MS’s commentary on Bhagavadgītā (hereafter BG), the Gūḍārthadīpikā
218 (Divanji 1933, pp. XIV–XVIII). Or, maybe, the Ra¯ma mentioned in these texts
219 could be Ra¯ma Tı¯rtha, who is said to be the Advaita teacher of MS at Va¯ra¯n
˙
ası¯.
220 By the middle of the XV century Caitanya was also living in Navadvı¯pa.15 MS
221 was profoundly touched by his teaching and through his mastering Navya Nya¯ya
222 logical tools he decided to firmly establish the devotional position of Caitanya
223 refuting the non-dualistic point of view. Since in Navadvı¯pa the teaching of Advaita
224 darśana was not allowed, MS moved to Va¯ra¯n
˙
ası¯, which was considered the
225 Advaita headquarter. There, without openly expressing his aim, he started learning
226 Advaita with Ra¯ma Tı¯rtha and Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ with Ma¯dhava Sarasvatı¯ (and maybe with
13 Together with Divanji’s, good surveys on MS’s date, life and works are Modi (1985, pp. 1–54), Nair
(1990), Gupta (2006, pp. 1–13) and Saha (2011, pp. 10–31). For establishing his date it might be useful to
mention Vis´vana¯tha Pan˜ca¯nana’s Bhedasiddhi, in open polemic with AS, since the same Vis´vana¯tha dated
his Gautamasūtravṛtti 1556 of the śaka era (= 1634 CE) (Gupta 2006, p. 5). Furthermore, among MS’s
pupils we find S´es
˙
a Govinda, who calls himself the son of S´es
˙
a Pan
˙
d
˙
ita. If the father of Govinda is held to
be identical with the well-known S´es
˙
a Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a who lived in the XVI century, which is not unlikely, the
synchronism of MS with S´es
˙
a Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a might be established (Kaviraj 1987, p. 156; Gupta 2006, p. 5). S´es
˙
a
Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a was the guru of Bhat
˙
t
˙
oji Dı¯ks
˙
ita (Gambhirananda 1998, pp. 14–15).
14 A popular verse quoted by all the monographs on MS informs us that he and two great Navya
Naiya¯yikas, namely Mathura¯na¯tha Tarkava¯gı¯s´a (ca. 1600-ca. 1675, Matilal 1977, p. 110) and Gada¯dhara
Bhat
˙
t
˙
a¯ca¯rya (between 1604 and 1709; Bhattacharya 1987, pp. 182–183) were contemporaries (even if this
is rather unlikely). The verse runs like this: navadvīpe samāyāte madhusūdanavākpatau / cakampe
tarkavāgīśaḥ kātaro ’bhūt gadādharaḥ //, “When the lord of the speech Madhusu¯dana reached Navadvı¯pa,
[Mathura¯na¯tha] Tarkava¯gı¯s´va trembled while Gada¯dhara [Bhat
˙
t
˙
a¯ca¯rya] became confused” (Thangaswami
1980, p. 286).
15 From MS’s commentary on Sarvajn˜a¯tman’s SS´, the Saṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha (SS´SS) II.51,
I.62 and I.220, we know that MS had some contact with Vallabha (1479–1531), the ācārya of
S´uddha¯dvaita Veda¯nta. Moreover, MS and two Gosva¯mins of Vr
˙
nda¯vana, Ru¯pa Gosva¯min (1554/5) and
Jı¯va Gosva¯min (1578/9), were almost contemporaries. MS’s reading of bhakti superficially resembles that
of the vaiṣṇava saints, even if it maintains strong peculiarities and irreducible differences due to a more
marked emphasis on non-dualism (Gupta 2006, pp. 122–125).
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227 Na¯ra¯yan
˙
a Bhat
˙
t
˙
a), both disciples of Ra¯mes´vara Bhat
˙
t
˙
a.16 Tradition has it (Saha
228 2011, pp. 20–26) that MS, while studying Advaita, understood the very core of this
229 darśana and confessed his previous intention to his teacher. Ra¯ma Tı¯rtha
230 appreciated and advised MS to enter into saṃnyāsa and, using navya style, to
231 refute the Dvaita point of view re-establishing the true message of Advaita. For
232 initiation he went to the senior authority among the saṃnyāsins, Vis´ves´vara
233 Sarasvatı¯, who asked MS to come back once he had written a new commentary on
234 BG. A year later the commentary was ready. Overwhelmed by its deepness,
235 Vis´ves´vara Sarasvatı¯ conferred the saṃnyāsadīkṣā to Kamalanayana, who became
236 Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯. It is also believed that MS spent the last period of his life at
237 Haridva¯ra, where he passed away.
238 II.1.1 MS’S Textual Production
239 Along with widely discussed problems of dating MS, the question related to the
240 authorship of all the works attributed to him is still open. Aufrecht’s Catalogus
241 Catalogorum (I, 2001, pp. 426–427) mentions 22 works under the name
242 Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯.17 Among these texts Divanji (1933, pp. II–III) individuates
243 some repetitions,18 reducing the number to 18. Out of these, as he elaborately
244 shows, we can consider only 10 granthas genuine. It is possible to divide these
245 works in two main groups: independent treatises (prakaraṇa) and commentaries
246 (bhāṣya/ṭīkā/vyākhyā). Among them there are some works with a marked Advaitic
247 tendency, and others that are absolutely devotional, while still others present both
248 aspects.
249 Among the commentaries we find: 1. Saṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha (hereafter
250 SS´SS), a commentary on the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajn˜a¯tman (hereafter SS´);19 2.
251 Gūḍhārthadīpikā (hereafter GAD), a running commentary on BG; 3. Siddhānta-
252 bindu (hereafter SB), an interesting compendium of Veda¯ntic topics based on the
253 Daśaślokī of S´am
˙
kara¯ca¯rya;20 4. Mahimnastotraṭīkā (hereafter MST
˙
) on
16 Na¯ra¯yan
˙
a Bhat
˙
t
˙
a was the son of Ra¯mes´vara Bhat
˙
t
˙
a, and, according to some accounts, the guru of
Ma¯dhava Sarasvatı¯. See fn. 71.
17 See also the XVIII volume of the New Catalogus Catalogorum compiled by Dash (2007, pp. 148–151)
and the bibliography (1995, pp. 583–585) of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy edited by K. Potter.
I will not discuss works just attributed to MS or others surely not his own (such as Ānandamandākinī,
Vedastuti, Ānandabodhaṭīkā, Aṣṭavikṛtivivaraṇa, Śāṇḍilyasūtraṭīkā, Rājñāṃpratibodha, and Kṛṣṇakutūha-
lanaṭaka).
18 For example, Aufrecht considers the Prasthānabheda an independent text.
19 Even though this gloss is not mentioned in other works by MS, based on its maṅgala verses and the
colophons it appears to be genuinely written by MS (Gupta 2006, p. 8). Divanji (1933, p. VI) adds that in
ARR (1917, p. 45) MS hints to his own other work while dealing with the removal of two of the four
kinds of impossibility (asaṃbhāvanā), which represent the impediments to attaining liberation. This same
issue is treated in very similar terms in the beginning of the III chapter (ad SS´ III.1, 2005, pp. 256–257)
and in a portion of the commentary of chapter IV (ad SS´ IV; 2005, pp. 642–643) of SS´SS. It might be
suggested that, due to the style and the extreme clarity coupled with a strict adherence to the commented
texts, this gloss is the first work of MS.
20 SB is openly referred to five times in AS: four in the first pariccheda and one in the fourth (Divanji
1933, p. IV).
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254 Pus
˙
padanta’s Śivamahimnastotra;21 5. Harilīlāvyākhyā (hereafter HLV) a commen-
255 tary on Vopadeva’s (mid-XIII-CE) Harilīlāmṛta;22 6. Bhāgavataprathamaślo-
256 kavyākhyā or Paramahaṃsapriya, a short commentary on the first verse of
257 Bhāgavatapurāṇa.23
258 On the side of the independent treatises, the following texts are listed: 7. AS; 8.
259 Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana (hereafter BBR);24 9. Vedāntakalpalatikā (hereafter
260 VKL);25 and 10. Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa (hereafter ARR), a reply to S´am
˙
kara Mis´ra’s
261 (XV cen. CE; 1442–1542, Saha 2011, p. 14) Bhedaratna (hereafter BR), which in
262 turn was a reply to S´rı¯hars
˙
a’s KKK, mainly directed to the eighth section of the first
263 pariccheda called Caturvidhabhedakhaṇḍana of the KKK (Yogı¯ndra¯nanda 1992,
264 pp. 96–121). This probably represents the last genuine work written by MS, since it
265 mentions his other works but is not referred to in them (Modi 1985, p. 54).26
266 As previously stated, according to tradition, in order to initiate the young MS into
267 saṃnyāsa, Vis´ves´vara Sarasvatı¯ demanded a commentary on BG (Saha 2011, p. 25).
268 Hence, GAD is believed to be the first work of MS. However, even though its style
269 is very clear and with minor uses of navya methodology, we find in it some
270 references to AS, BBR, and SB, which make it impossible to consider it his first
271 work.27
272 II.1.2 MS between Advaita and Bhakti
273 From the glorious vaiṣṇava movement of Bengal MS inherited his devotion to Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a
274 as it is depicted in the BP. MS, in fact, occupies an important position among the
21 Despite the fact that this stotra is evidently devoted to extolling S´iva, the commentator turns the verses
to concern both Vis
˙
n
˙
u and S´iva. In addition, in the opening verses as well as in the colophon he mentions
his guru Vis´ves´vara; the Vedāntakalpalatikā is also referred herein as the author’s own work (ad
Mahimnastotra 26–27). Divanji (1933, p. VIII) affirms that in the commentary on verse 27 the author
writing anyatroktam asti tat sarvam… hints at the closing section on the VIII verse of Daśaślokī in SB.
The Prasthānabheda, sometimes edited separately, is nothing but MS’s commentary on the VII verse of
the Mahimnastotra. Hanneder confirms both the genuine attribution to MS of this gloss and that the
Prasthānabheda is an extract of the Mahimnastotraṭīkā (1999, pp. 576–577).
22 According to Modi (1985, p. 37) this is a work of MS, while for Abhyankar Sastri (SB 1986, p. 27), its
author, is a different Madhusu¯dana; but there are no evidences for either of these views. However, Gupta
(2006, p. 9) concludes that, due to the certain similarities in style and argumentations, this could be MS’s
work.
23 Transmitted without a colophon, this short work mentions the Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana (Divanji 1933,
p. VIII). Therefore many scholars accept it as a work of MS.
24 This is perhaps the most important devotional work of MS in three ullāsas, in which he treats the
essence of devotion, the condition through which the mind becomes eligible for devotion, its various
stages (bhūmikā), and the emotions (bhāva) produced by merging in those stages. In it MS, building on
Bhāgavatapurāṇa’s teachings, describes bhakti as an independent spiritual path capable to leading to the
supreme goal. MS mentions VKL (1998, p. 54) at I.19 and SB at I.24 (1998, p. 57). GAD (XVIII.66)
refers to BBR for a deeper examination of the topic at hand.
25 VKL is referred to six times in the AS (Divanji 1933, p. IV).
26 By contrast, at the beginning of his introduction Modi (1985) says that the last works of MS are AS
and GAD.
27 In GAD ad BG II.16, II.18 and V.16 one can find a direct reference to AS; SB is mentioned in GAD ad
BG II.18. Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana (BBR) is referred to in GAD ad BG VII.16, XVIII.65–66.
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275 vaiṣṇavas of his time (Ananta S´a¯strı¯ Phad
˙
ke 1961, p. 8). This is witnessed by the
276 four markedly devotional works attributed to him: BBR, Harilīlāvyākhyā, MST
˙
, and
277 Paramahaṃsapriya.28 His love for Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a and his faith in Advaita made him a
278 successor of the Advaita theological hermeneutics represented by the commentaries
279 on the Bhāgavatapurāṇa written by Vopadeva and S´rı¯dhara (XIII CE). These two
280 authors represented a tendency in which non-dualism and bhakti found a common
281 ground and, in some way, harmoniously merged into one. Vopadeva and S´rı¯dhara
282 harmonized the Upanis
˙
adic concept of an immutable, unqualified, formless,
283 ineffable brahman to the infinitely charming personality of a godhead.
284 Hence, it could be also maintained that in AS and in other writings, MS
285 transformed Advaita itself. He allowed a scope for bhakti as a path independent, or
286 rather complementary, to Vedic and Veda¯ntic prescriptions, in such a way that the
287 philosophical implications for Advaita have still not been fully assessed. Modi
288 (1985: 12-13) argues that:
289 In spite of being a follower of S´an˙kara’s monism, he was an ardent devotee of
290 S´rı¯ Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a. To Madhusu¯dana, this was neither self-contradictory nor surprising
291 […] Just as in the days of Kuma¯rila and S´an˙kara the most important problem
292 was the reconciliation of karma and jñāna, so in the days of Madhusu¯dana and
293 Vallabha the greatest problem was that of jñāna and bhakti29 […] but it was
294 left for Madhusu¯dana to solve it thoroughly.
295 Besides, in several places he openly, even if respectfully, disagreed with
296 S´am
˙
kara¯ca¯rya himself (Minkowski 2011, p. 222).30
297 II.2 Some Instances of Internal Evidences for Establishing a Relative
298 Chronology of MS’s Works
299 Sanjukta Gupta courageously attempted an internal chronology of the works of MS
300 (2006, pp. 10–11). I personally believe we should wait for a further historical as
301 well as philological examination of them, since the elements we possess right now
302 are not at all conclusive. What I could plausibly say is just that among the ten works
303 by MS considered genuine, it seems that the first written was SS´SS and the last
304 ARR. I could also push myself to affirm that VKL and SB, which mention each
305 other, might have been composed at around the same time. In addition, GAD and
28 Among the devotional works attributed to MS there is also Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa, brought to light in
1921 by M. M. Gan
˙
apati S´a¯strı¯ at Trivandrum. According to Divanji (1933, p. XII) and Modi (1985, p.
46) it is a genuine work because it summarily covers almost all the issues touched by SB. However, since
it is quite usual for Advaita textbooks to cover these issues, and since there are no direct references to
MS’s other works, its authorship remains an open issue.
29 Together with the explicit devotionally directed works, it should be mentioned that MS tries, mainly in
GAD XVIII.54 and XVIII.56–66, to harmonise bhakti, yoga and jñāna.
30 Most famous instances of this reverential disagreement are in AS Āgamabādhoddhāra (AS 1997, pp.
435–436) as regards S´am
˙
kara’s interpretation of Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (hereafter BSBh) II.2.28–29, where
according to MS the aphorism does not refute Vijn˜a¯nava¯dins, as claimed by S´am
˙
kara, but S´u¯nyava¯dins
(Modi 1985, p. 7). MS differs from S´am
˙
kara also in GAD where the views of the ācārya are not in
harmony with the bhaktimārga of the Gītā (Modi app. iii), so he interprets it in a new light, especially as
for the comments ad II.29, II.39, VI.14 and XVIII.66.
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306 ARR mention AS, thus, they must be later, and HLV does not refer to any other
307 work of MS. AS mentions also VKL and SB. In fact, these three texts treat almost
308 analogous topics. To sum up, after SS´SS come SB, VKL and only at a more mature
309 stage AS, where SB, VKL and GAD are mentioned. The MST
˙
mentions only VKL,
310 while dealing with the means of knowledge for establishing brahman (ad MS 26,
311 1996, p. 103) and with the arousal of the undetermined knowledge of the word (ad
312 MS 27, 1996, p. 107); BBR refers to VKL (1998, p. 54) while presenting the nature
313 of the mind, and later on to SB (1998, p. 58). The BPPP refers to BBR concerning
314 bhaktirasa.31 In any case it is interesting to note that in nearly all of his texts MS
315 refers very much to his other works. By some extent, this tendency is quite
316 remarkable, because it gives us an idea of the personality of MS and of his self-
317 confidence concerning his works (Devı¯ 1988, pp. 9–12). It could also be maintained
318 that for attempting an internal chronology among MS’s works we can look at them
319 from a diachronic perspective as well as from a synchronic one. It might be, in fact,
320 that MS composed part of a text and periodically abandoned it for some time while
321 working on other texts and later went back to it. On one side this could explain the
322 many cross-references of MS within his own works, and on the other the difficulty
323 to determine with certitude a relative chronology.
324 Here, I shall limit my investigation to a small number of the more relevant
325 instances of cross-references in SB, VKL, AS, GAD, BBR, and ARR (I will
326 mention SS´SS just en passant). The comparison of the maṅgala verses offers
327 interesting data (the different writing style in the table shows the different versions
328 of the same concept.):
330331
332 AS (1997: 8) śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām aikyena
sa¯ks
˙
a¯tkr
˙
tama¯dhava¯na¯m/
spars´ena nirdhu¯tatamorajobhyah
˙
pa¯dotthitebhyo ’stu namo
rajobhyah
˙
// 2 //
333 GAD (2005: 744) śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānāṃ prasa¯dam a¯sa¯dya maya¯
guru¯n
˙
a¯m/
vya¯khya¯nam etad vihitam
˙
subodham
˙
samarpitam
˙
taccaran
˙
a¯mbujes
˙
u// 5 //
334 SB (SB/S, 1933: 1) s´rı¯s´am
˙
kara¯ca¯ryanava¯vata¯ram
˙
viśveśvaraṃ vis´vagurum
˙
pran
˙
amya/
veda¯ntas´a¯stras´ravan
˙
a¯lasa¯na¯m
˙
bodha¯ya kurve kam api
prabandham// 1 //
335 VKL (1962: 1) dura¯pah
˙
s´a¯stra¯rtho niyatayatama¯nair api budhair
na sam
˙
pra¯ptum
˙
s´akyo malinamatina¯ yady api maya¯/
tatha¯pi śrīviśveśvaracaran
˙
apan˙keruhasudha¯-
sudha¯ra¯bhih
˙
sikto na katham api rikto ’smi bhavita¯// 2 //
31 In this contribution I limit myself to presenting some textual instances of internal cross-references in
MS’s works, so I shall not examine all their colophons (puṣpikā) except for VKL.
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336
337 MSṬ (1996: 1) viśveśvaraṃ gurum
˙
natva¯ mahima¯khyastuter ayam/
pu¯rva¯ca¯ryakr
˙
tavya¯khya¯sam
˙
grahah
˙
kriyate maya¯// 1 //
338 ARR (1917: 46) advaitaratnam etat tu śrīviśveśvarapa¯dayoh
˙
/
samarpitam athaitena prı¯yata¯m
˙
sa daya¯nidhih
˙
//
339 SŚSS (I, 2002: 2) śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānāṃ pran
˙
amya
pa¯da¯m
˙
bujapun
˙
yapa¯m
˙
su¯n/
tes
˙
a¯m
˙
prabha¯va¯d aham asmi yogyah
˙
s´ila¯pi caitanyam
alabdhayebhyah
˙
// 2 //
340
341 GAD’s instance (2005, p. 744) is an example of the content of these benedictory
2 verses: “Having obtained the grace of my teachers S´rı¯ra¯ma, Vis´ves´vara and
343 Ma¯dhava, I compose this easy explanation, offered at their lotus feet.” In all the
344 instances presented MS extols his teachers (Vis´ves´vara, S´rı¯ra¯ma and Ma¯dhava) with
345 maṅgala stanzas placed either at the beginning or at the end (for GAD and ARR) of
346 his texts. These repeated and standardized references to his masters in the maṅgala
347 verses help us to reconstruct MS’s life and to differentiate between the authentic
348 works and the spurious ones.
349 II.2.1 AS
350 The AS is certainly the pivotal point among all the works of MS, not only as a
351 landmark for the internal coherence of the author himself, but also for the later
352 generation of Advaitins. As a matter of fact, for the Advaitins post-MS, following
353 the AS becomes a must, a stamp of orthodoxy and adherence to tradition, as well as
354 a sign of great doctrinal skill. In other words, Advaitins after MS could not help
355 being “madhusu¯danian”. In addition, MS writes the AS to turn around the stagnant
356 dialectical vis of Advaita, defending, rewriting and correcting old positions. Nearly
357 all the positions of MS are present in the AS; all the issues treated in the other works
358 are here present in a very elaborated and enlarged way.32
359 II.2.2 GAD
360 This running gloss to BG33 is an extremely interesting text, free from all the
361 technicalities of AS, SB, VKL, and ARR, but extremely useful for comprehending
32 As for its relative chronology, AS is referred to in GAD ad BG II.16 (2005, pp. 79–80), while dealing
with the difference between real (sat) and unreal (asat); GAD ad BG II.18 (2005, pp. 93–94), explaining
the difference between direct and indirect cognition; GAD ad BG V.16 (2005, p. 276) dealing with the
nature of the unreal. ARR refers to AS in dealing with hearing (śravaṇa, 1917, p. 9); with the nature of the
unreal (1917, p. 26); with reflecting (manana) and meditating (nididhyāsana) in two passages (1917, pp.
24, 37). On the other hand, AS refers to SB in differentiating the empirical degree of reality from the
absolute one (1997, p. 536); while diversifying direct and indirect cognition (1997, p. 579), discussing
dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda (1997, p. 537) and manana and nididhyāsana (1997, p. 559). AS mentions also VKL on
śravaṇa (1997, pp. 524, 866), manana and nididhyāsana (1997, p. 519) as well as abhihitānvayavāda
(1997, p. 705).
33 The version of the BG used by MS for his commentary differs in some verses from the vulgata. Cf. I.8,
I.46, VI.9, VIII.16, IX.21, XI.8, XI.17. XI.28, XI.37, XI.41, XIII.20, XIV.23, XIV.25 and XV.5 (Saha
2011, p. 370).
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362 the XVI century understanding of the BG. Apart from being a real treasure chest of
363 quotations and new readings of several Advaitin and non-Advaitin texts, it directly
364 refers to many of MS’s works.
365 For example, in GAD ad BG VII.16 (caturvidhā bhajante māṃ janāḥ sukṛtino
366 ’rjuna / ārto jijñāsur arthārthī jñānī ca bharatarṣabha //), where the words in the
367 BG verse recall a devotional context, BBR is mentioned just as an internal
368 annotation of MS, maybe for his readers, which indicates that the subject bhakti,
369 with its subdivisions and its means, is analysed specifically in BBR.34 More
370 interesting are the references to BBR in GAD ad BG XVIII.65 and 66. GAD
371 (XVIII) quotes two verses from Bhāgavatapurāṇa (VII.5.23–24), also cited in BBR
372 (1997, p. 108). Immediately thereafter, MS refers to BBR saying etac ca
373 bhaktirasāyane vyākhyātaṃ vistāreṇa “and this has been explained at length in
374 Bhaktirasāyana.” However, in BBR, the topic concerned is the hearing of the
375 qualities of Vis
˙
n
˙
u (hariguṇaśruti, BBR 1997, p. 106), which constitutes the fourth
376 level of devotion (bhaktibhūmikā).35 In the passage there is no original explanation,
377 but rather a sequence of verses from Bhāgavatapurāṇa, which are cited directly as
378 they are. What is interesting is that there also MS cites BG XVIII.65 (BBR 1997, p.
379 113). Therefore, we have a cross reference in the two texts.
380 Moreover, the next verse (BG XVIII.66)36 is possibly another instance of the use
381 of BBR material in GAD. The context is the definition of bhakti and the means for
382 it, and the two texts are quite similar in referring to the subject:
384385
386 GAD ad BG XVIII.66 (2005, p. 734) BBR I.1 (1998, p. 5)
387 nis´cayena parama¯nandaghanamu¯rtim
388 anantam
˙
s´rı¯va¯sudevam eva bhagavantam
389 anuks
˙
an
˙
abha¯vanaya¯ bhajasva, idam eva
390 paramam
˙
tattvam
˙
na¯to ’dhikam astı¯ti
391 vicārapūrvakena premaprakarṣeṇa
392 sarvānātmacintāśūnyatayā manovṛttyā
393 tailadhārāvad avicchinnayā satataṃ
394 cintayety arthaḥ.
tatas´ ca¯drutacittasya nirvedapu¯rvakam
˙
tattvajn˜a¯nam
˙
, drutacittasya tu
bhagavatkatha¯s´ravan
˙
a¯dibha¯gavata-
dharmas´raddha¯pu¯rvika¯ bhaktir ity
avadhitvena dvayam apy upa¯ttam. tato
’ntaḥkaraṇaśuddhyāṣṭāṅgayogam
anuṣṭhāya tailadhārāvad
avicchinnabhagavadekākārapratyaya-
paramparātmakaikāgratāyogyaṃ
manas sampādayet.
34 GAD (2005, p. 393): bhagavadanuraktirūpāyās tu bhakteḥ svarūpaṃ sādhanaṃ bhedās tathā
bhaktānām api bhagavadbhaktirasāyane ’smābhiḥ saviśeṣaṃ prapañcitā itīhoparamyate “I especially
elaborated on the nature, the means and the subdivisions of devotion, whose form is love for the Lord, as
well as [the nature, the means and the subdivisions] of the devotees in the Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana, so
here I stop.”
35 There is also a terminological correspondence between BBR (1997, p. 115) and GAD (2005, p. 733).
Both texts call the means to supreme bhakti the performance of duties related to the Lord
(bhāgavatadharmānuṣṭhāna).
36 In the commentary of this verse MS disagrees with S´am
˙
kara in interpreting the word -dharmān.
According to MS it means all kinds of social duties etc. (GAD ad BG XVIII.66, 2005, p. 734, kecid
varṇadharmāḥ kecid āśramadharmāḥ kecit sāmānyadharmā ity evaṃ sarvān api dharmān parityajya,
vidyamānān avidyamānān vā śaraṇatvenānādṛtya), while for S´am
˙
kara it stands for karman: sarvad-
harmān parityajya saṃnyāsya sarvakarmāṇi iti etat (BG1, III, 2000, p. 400).
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395
396
397
398 In both texts MS refers to bhakti using a very similar terminology, but this is due
399 to an already commonly accepted definition, which drives us back to Ra¯ma¯nuja’s
400 definition of bhaktiyoga as a condition of devotional contemplation (dhyāna/
401 upāsanā).37 Both instances compare devotion with a flux of oil (tailadhārā)38 and
402 treat it as a series (paramparā) of uninterrupted (avicchinna) mental modifications
403 (manovṛtti) with the Lord alone as content (bhagavadekākāra). This mental
404 condition has some analogous requirements for both texts: in GAD a constant
405 reflection (vicāra), an extreme degree of love (premaprakarṣa) and a mind free from
406 all sensual objects (sarvānātmacintāśūnya); similarly, BBR presupposes a mental
407 purity (antaḥkaraṇaśuddhi) and the practice of the aṣṭāṅgayoga.
408 Modi (1985, p. 49, n. 41) noted that GAD ad BG II.13, II.15 and II.28 relies
409 almost verbatim on SB without directly acknowledging it. To these unacknowledged
410 references I would personally also add GAD ad BG II.17. Let us now consider two
411 of them in detail.
412 BG II.13 regards a comparison of the several changes occurring within a single
413 life, with the jīvātman who jumps from one bodily existence to another one. On the
414 other side, the corresponding SB passage lies just at the beginning of the analysis of
415 the meaning of the term tvam in the mahāvākya “Thou are That!” (tat tvam asi,
416 Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.8.7 ff.), where tvam is nothing but the individual self. Both
417 texts present a few divergent opinions (vipratipatti) regarding the ātman’s nature:39
419420
421 GAD ad BG II.13 (2005, pp. 63–64) SB I (SB/S, 1933, p. 5; SB/NR/LV,
1989, pp. 106–113)
422 etena yad a¯hur dehamātram ātmeti
423 cārvākāḥ, indriyāṇi manaḥ prāṇaś ceti
424 tad ekadeśinaḥ, kṣaṇikaṃ vijñānam iti
425 saugatāḥ, dehātiriktaḥ sthiro
426 dehaparimāṇa iti digambarāḥ.
tatra dehākārapariṇatāni catvāri
bhūtāny eva tvampadārtha iti
cārvākāḥ. cakṣurādīni pratyekam
ity apare. militānīty anye. mana ity
eke. prāṇa ity anye. kṣaṇikaṃ
vijñānam iti saugatāḥ. s´u¯nyam iti
ma¯dhyamika¯h
˙
. dehendriyātirikto
dehaparimāṇa iti digambarāḥ.
427
428 Here the close similarity between the two parts is clear. In both passages MS
9 opens with Ca¯rva¯kas, then Buddhists (saugata) and Jainas (digambara). In SB he
430 specifies that according to the majority of Cārvākas “the meaning of the term tvam”
431 (tvaṃpadārtha) is nothing but the four gross elements (bhūta) transformed into
432 physical shape (dehākārapariṇatāni). Then he lists some divergent minor opinions
37 Ra¯ma¯nuja, in his Śrībhāṣya (I.1.1, 1989, pp. 55–56; see also IV.1.1), defines dhyāna as dhyānaṃ ca
tailadhārāvad avicchinnasmṛtisantānarūpam, “and contemplation is of the nature of a sequence of
uninterrupted awareness, like a flow of oil”. A similar instance is in Ra¯ma¯nuja’s commentary on BG
IX.34, precisely while he glosses on the first half-line manmanā bhava: sarvasvāmini tailadhārāvad
avicchedena niviṣṭamanā bhava “be with your mind like a flow of oil uninterruptedly immersed in the
Lord of everything” (BG1, II, 2000, p. 196).
38 The quality of oil is greasiness (sneha), which also means “affection” or “love”.
39 This nearly resembles, in a matter of language and order, the opening part of VKL where MS lists the
different views about liberation (1962, pp. 3–13). For an instance of this subject see the last part of the
Sect. II.2.3 concerning VKL.
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433 among them (ekadeśin): according to some philosophers the term tvam indicates
434 respectively the faculties (indriya) or the breaths (prāṇa) or the mind (manas)
435 individually taken (pratyeka); for others they should be understood jointly (milita).
436 The slight difference between GAD and SB lies in the fact that while GAD refers to
437 the divergences at a stretch SB is a bit more analytic. The short sentences concerning
438 Buddhists and Jainas are almost identical. Nonetheless, MS does not mention the
439 other text in which he deals with the same issues, because this is a typical
440 presentation of Advaita texts. Thus, in this case there is no real need for a clear
441 citation or reference because every Advaitin is aware of the locus classicus for this
442 introduction, meaning the Advaita’s mine40 of knowledge par excellence: BSBh
443 (I.1.1).
444 Another instance of textual re-use from GAD, not recognized by Modi, is ad BG
445 II.17 and concerns the condition of deep sleep. The passages are mutually connected
446 but the way of referring to each other is not immediately clear:
448449
450 GAD ad BG II.17 (2005, p. 82) SB VIII (SB/S 1933, pp. 69–70; SB/
NR/LV 1989, pp. 420–426; SB 1986,
pp. 121–125)
451 suṣuptāv aham
˙
ka¯ra¯bha¯ve ’pi tadva¯-
452 sana¯va¯sita¯jn˜a¯nabha¯sakasya caitanyasya
453 svatah
˙
sphuran
˙
a¯t. anyathāitāvantaṃ
454 kālam ahaṃ kim api nājñāsiṣam iti
455 suṣuptotthitasya smaraṇaṃ na syāt. na
456 cotthitasya jn˜a¯na¯bha¯va¯numitir iyam iti
457 va¯cyam
˙
, suṣuptikālarūpapakṣājñānāl
458 liṅgāsaṃbhavāc ca. asmaraṇāder
459 vyabhicāritvāt smaran
˙
a¯janaka-
460 nirvikalpa¯dyabha¯va¯sa¯dhakatva¯c ca.
461 jn˜a¯nasa¯magryabha¯vasya
462 ca¯nyonya¯s´rayagrastatva¯t.
iha ca sukham aham asvāpsaṃ na
kiṃcid avediṣam iti suptotthitasya
parāmarśāt, ananubhave ca
parāmarśānupapatteḥ.
antah
˙
karan
˙
opara¯gaka¯lı¯na¯nu-
bhavajanyatva¯bha¯va¯c ca na
tattollekha¯bha¯ve ’pi smaraṇatvānu-
papattiḥ. smaraṇe
tattollekhaniyamābhāvāc ca
jāgraddaśāyām asvāpsam ity
anubhavānupapatteḥ liṅgābhāvena ca
āśrayāsiddhyā cānumānasyāsaṃ-
bhavāt. aham
˙
ka¯ras tu uttha¯nasamaya
eva¯nubhu¯yate. sus
˙
uptau lı¯natvena
tasya¯nanubhu¯tatva¯t smaran
˙
a¯nupapatteh
˙
[…] tatra¯ntah
˙
karan
˙
avr
˙
ttijanakasa¯magrı¯-
sam
˙
bhave ’pi prama¯tva¯bha¯va¯varodhe-
na¯ntah
˙
karan
˙
asya¯sa¯marthya¯t.
463
464 In both passages MS refers to the recollection (parāmarśa/smaraṇa) arising in
5 the awakened person (suptottitha) after deep sleep (suṣupti): in GAD “During that
40 In SB VIII (SB/S 1933, p. 61), MS most probably refers to BSBh calling it the “mine” (ākara): yathā
caitat tathā vyaktam ākare.
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466 much time I did not know anything” (etāvantaṃ kālam ahaṃ kim api nājñāsiṣam)
467 and in SB “I slept well, I did not know anything” (sukham aham asvāpsaṃ na
468 kiṃcid avediṣam). These sections from both texts, in addition, point out the
469 impossibility of understanding this recollection as an inference (anumānasyāsaṃ-
470 bhavāt) because the probans (hetu) of this hypothetical inference would necessarily
471 be flawed. The two texts just differ on the nature of the pseudo-probans
472 (hetvābhāsa): a deviating (vyabhicārin) one for GAD and the non-establishment
473 of the inferential locus/subject (āśrayāsiddhi) for SB.
474 In the GAD passage the core of the analysis aims at establishing the auto-
475 luminosity (svaprakāśatva) of the self, which persists also during deep sleep. SB is
476 more focused on proving the nature of recollection of the cognition arising after
477 awakening. In deep sleep, while the ego has merged into its cause (i.e. ignorance),
478 the consciousness illuminates that ignorance consisting of ego impressions. If this
479 were not accepted, it would be impossible to explain the recollection of the just
480 awakened person: “I slept well, I did not know anything” (see below, Sect. 3.2.3).
481 II.2.3 VKL: Quotations as Evidence about Missing Portions
482 Karmarkar’s edition of VKL (1962) is based on two manuscripts, the first from the
483 British Library’s former India Office (IO) and the second from the A¯nanda¯s´rama
484 (A¯) Library in Poona, as well as on the only other printed edition, edited at Benares
485 in 1920 by Ganganath Jha and Gopinath Kaviraj. The two manuscripts end
486 respectively with these colophons: IO) iti vedāntakalpalatikāyāṃ paramahaṃsa-
487 parivrajakamadhusūdanasarasvatīkṛtāyāṃ sasādhanāpavarganirūpaṇaṃ nāma
488 prathamastabakaḥ; Ā) iti śrīparamahaṃsaśrīviśveśvarasarasvatīśiṣyaśrīma-
489 dhusūdanasarasvatyuktavedāntakalpalatikāyāṃ sasādhanāpavarganirūpaṇaḥ pra-
490 thamastabakaḥ saṃpūrṇaḥ (Karmarkar 1962, pp. ix–xi). As easily visible, both the
491 colophons refer to the extant VKL as the first (prathama) stabaka ‘chapter’, named
492 “Description of the realization together with the means [for attaining it]”
493 (sasādhanāpavarganirūpaṇa), of the entire VKL. Until now, unfortunately, no
494 other manuscript of VKL has been found (Panicker 1995, pp. 116–117). More
495 precisely, there is more evidence for the assumption that there might be some
496 additional stabakas in VKL. For instance, VKL has been referred to twice in SB.
497 The first reference is in the commentary on the eighth stanza of Daśaślokī (SB/S
498 1933, p. 70; SB/NR/LV 1989, pp. 431–432; SB 1986, p. 133). The reference is at the
499 end of an elaborate discussion concerning the condition of deep sleep (suṣuptya-
500 vasthā). Once the jīvātman penetrates deep sleep the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) is
501 also absorbed in its cause (kāraṇa), namely avidyā, and steps back remaining only
502 as a latent impression (vāsanā). On getting back to the waking condition, the
503 individual has a kind of recollection (parāmarśa): “I pleasantly slept, I did not know
504 anything!” (sukham aham asvāpsam na kiṃcid avediṣam). This kind of cognition
505 presupposes an earlier direct experience of pleasure (sukha) and ignorance (ajñāna).
506 If the internal organ is absent during deep sleep, then to whom can these experiences
507 be attributed to? Without an experience there cannot be such a subsequent
508 recollection. To this MS answers by distinguishing three kinds of functional modes
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509 (vṛtti) of ignorance: one in the form of the witness (sākṣyākāra) of that experience,
510 one in the form of pleasure (sukhākāra) and another in the form of a particular state
511 of ignorance limited to that precise situation (avasthājñāna).41
512 Here we find a peculiar reading of MS. He says that in deep sleep there is no
513 antaḥkaraṇa, no ego at all, so it cannot be experienced. A recollection of the self as
514 superimposed on the ego takes place, but this is only due to avidyā. Recollection,
515 like doubt and perceptual errors, is dependent on the witness, thus it cannot be
516 intended as right knowledge, which is grasped by the function of some means of
517 knowledge (pramāṇa); but it is also not a totally false cognition. Thus MS does not
518 understand it to be a kind of knowledge, but simply as a mental activity (mānasī
519 kriyā). By the way, in establishing this, MS refers to a passage from S´am
˙
kara’s
520 Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya (I.1.4):
522523
524 BSBh (BSBh/VK/KP 2000: 129; BSBh/B/
525 RP/NN 2000: 83)
SB (SB/S 1933, p 70; SB/NR/LV
1989, pp. 426–427; SB 1986,
p. 127)
526 yatha¯ ca ‘purus
˙
o va¯va gautama¯gnih
˙
’ (ChU
527 V.7.1), ‘yos
˙
a¯ va¯va gautama¯gnih
˙
’ (ChU
528 V.8.1) ity atra yos
˙
itpurus
˙
ayor agnibuddhir
529 mānasī kriyā kevalacodanājanyatvāt
530 kriyaiva sa¯ purus
˙
atantra¯ ca.
ata eva codanājanyatvān mānasī
kriyā sa¯, na jn˜a¯nam.
531
532 MS then completes his explanation by jumping to a different issue. Just as the
3 recollection is a mental function (manovṛtti) different (vilakṣaṇa) from perceptual
534 error (bhrama) and right knowledge (pramā), the hypothetical argumentation
535 (tarka) is a kind of mental function which, being dependent on desire (icchādhīna),
536 is different from perceptual error and right knowledge. This particular understand-
537 ing of tarka plays a role in the analysis of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad ([hereafter
538 Br
˙
U] VI.4.5): ātmā vā re […] śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ. This Upanis
˙
adic
539 sentence is an injunction (vidhi), which in the process of reflecting the real purport
540 of Veda¯nta sentences (vedāntavicāra) prescribes as primary (pradhāna/mukhya)
541 towards realization (darśana) the hearing (śravaṇa) of the teaching about the self.
542 Conversely, reflection (manana) and meditation (nididhyāsana) are auxiliaries
543 (sahakārin/ārādupakāraka). This kind of vedāntavicāra has the shape of a fourfold
544 tarka,42 the explanation of which, according to MS, is distributed within the four
41 MS has two different views of sākṣin, one metaphysical and one epistemological. For this division see
Gupta (2006, pp. 92–93).
42 MSmentions these four types of tarkas, and adds a fifth one, which are nothing but five forms of positive
(anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) agreements: (1) dṛgdṛśyānvayavyatireka; (2) sākṣisākṣyānvayavyatireka;
(3) āgamāpāyitadavadhyanvayavyatireka; (4) duḥkhaparamapremāspadānvayavyatireka; 5) anuvṛttavyā-
vṛttānvayavyatireka.
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545 adhyāyas of the BSBh. At this point MS refers to VKL: vistāras tu vedāntakal-
546 palatikāyām anusandheyaḥ “By contrast, an elaborate [explanation] should be
547 searched in the Vedāntakalpalatikā.”
548 What is interesting for our purpose is that in the VKL, apart from an elusive
549 mention to these tarkas, I could not find any elaborate discussion on these topics
550 (Divanji 1933, pp. 193–194 notes).
551 Let us now look at this issue through the words of both texts where, even without
552 verbatim citation, there is nonetheless clear mutual reference:43
554555
556 VKL (1962, pp. 172–173) SB (SB/S 1933, pp. 70; SB/NR/LV 1989,
pp. 427–432; SB 1986, pp. 127–133)
557 tato ’dvitı¯yabrahmaikyavis
˙
a-
558 yaveda¯ntas´aktita¯tparyanis´cayaphalake-
559 na śravaṇākhyatarkeṇa
560 kriya¯rthatva¯dibhir hetva¯bha¯sair va¯
561 advitı¯yabrahma¯tmaikye veda¯nta¯na¯m
˙
562 pra¯ma¯n
˙
ya¯sam
˙
bhavaru¯pas´ cittados
˙
ah
˙
.
563 evam
˙
veda¯nta¯na¯m
˙
564 pra¯ma¯n
˙
ya¯sam
˙
bha¯vana¯pracayahetu-
565 bhu¯tacittaika¯gryapratibandhakas´
566 cittados
˙
ah
˙
567 prameyasam
˙
bha¯vana¯phalakena
568 mananākhyena tarkeṇa. tato
569 ’nya¯nuparaktabrahma¯tmaikya-
570 vis
˙
ayasam
˙
ska¯rapracayena
571 hetujn˜a¯navr
˙
ttiphalakena prayatnena
572 nididhyāsanākhyena, ana¯di-
573 pravr
˙
ttideha¯tmajn˜a¯najan-
574 itasam
˙
ska¯rapracayah
˙
cittados
˙
o
575 ’pasa¯ryate.
vya¯pya¯ropen
˙
a
vya¯pakaprasan˜jana¯tmakasya tasya
iccha¯dhı¯nataya¯
bhramaprama¯vilaks
˙
an
˙
atva¯t. ata eva
manananididhya¯sanasahite śravaṇākhye
veda¯ntavica¯re ‘śrotavyo mantavyo
nididhyāsitavya’ itya¯dividhir
upapadyate, tasya caturvidhānvayavya-
tirekāditarkaru¯patva¯t.
dṛgdṛśyānvayavyatirekaḥ,
sākṣisākṣyānvayavyatirekaḥ,
āgamāpāyitadavadhyanvaya-
vyatirekaḥ, duḥkhaparama-
premāspadānvayavyatireka iti.
anuvṛttavyāvṛttānvayavyatirekaḥ
pan˜camah
˙
. etac ca sarves
˙
a¯m
˙vedāntānukūlatarkāṇāṃ
caturlaks
˙
an
˙
ı¯mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯pratipa¯dita¯na¯m
upalaks
˙
an
˙
am ity abhiyukta¯h
˙
.
576
577 In both texts the main referent is a particular meaning of hypothetical
8 argumentation or reasoning (tarka), again intended as a mental operation. But
579 while in VKL hearing (śravaṇa) and reflection (manana) are called tarkas, SB lists
580 the five tarkas mentioned in the table. Here we see that in VKL there is a reference
581 to tarkas as a means to attaining the non-dual, liberating knowledge, but they are
582 nothing but hearing (śravaṇa), reflection (manana) and meditation (nididhyāsana).
43 The two texts quote or refer to each other many times. SB (Sarasvati 1986, p. 133) refers to śravaṇa
mentioning VKL; it differentiates between the vyāvahārika and pāramārthika level of reality referring to
VKL (SB, 1986, p. 151). VKL (1962, pp. 163–164) mentions SB on presenting the process of
manifestation (sṛṣṭikrama).
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583 So there is not a correspondence with the very technical meaning touched on in SB,
584 where MS informed the reader that VKL should treat the topic at length.
585 Another similar instance concerning again VKL and SB (SB/S 1933: 76; SB/
586 NR/LV 1989: 442; SB 1986, p. 141) is placed right at the end of the
587 commentary of the eighth stanza of Daśaślokī. Here MS, having already
588 described the three conditions (avasthātraya) through which the jīvātman and the
589 three principles identified (abhimānin) with those same conditions pass in a
590 microcosmic sphere, shifts to a macrocosmic sphere. In doing so, he follows
591 BSBh (I.3.13) and establishes a link between individual (adhyātma), elemental
592 (adhibhūta) and divine (adhidaiva) levels, which correspond to each letter of the
593 monosyllable oṃ, namely a, u and m. A meditative practice (upāsanā) aiming at
594 the unifying vision of all these principles leads to the world of Hiran
˙
yagarbha
595 (hiraṇyagarbhalokaprāpti) and the subsequent gradual liberation (kramamukti). In
596 contrast, direct liberation (sākṣāt-mokṣa) is the knowledge of the underlying
597 reality, the witness consciousness (sākṣicaitanya) of all these principles, free
598 from all limitations. Since the three conditions, together with the three principles
599 identified with them, are products of ignorance (avidyātmakatvāt), they are
600 ultimately false (mithyā), while the witness alone shines as the fourth (turīya). In
601 closing this section, MS again refers to a more detailed and developed
602 argumentation within VKL: vistareṇa caitat prapañcitam asmābhir vedāntakal-
603 palatikāyām ity uparamyate “And this very [issue] has been elaborately
604 developed by us in Vedāntakalpalatikā. So I stop [here].”
605 I agree with Divanji (1933, 201 notes) when he affirms that in VKL there is
606 nowhere a similar discussion regarding the three conditions of the jīvātman. The
607 only mention in VKL (1962, p. 98) of dream phenomena (svapna) is inserted in a
608 completely different analysis. Therefore, it should be rather likely that at least one
609 or more stabakas can still be found.
610 As a last remark in this section I would like to shift the attention to a common
611 issue of VKL (1962, pp. 3–13) and SS´SS (ad IV.1; 2005, pp. 634–643). Actually, if
612 SS´SS is the first work of MS, the first part of the fourth chapter really seems to be
613 the pattern on which MS built the discussion at the opening section of VKL. The
614 two sections are almost identical in many parts. I notice only very minor changes in
615 order or expression, such as the use of synonyms etc.
616 Since this discussion occupies many pages, I just extract a few less common
617 examples to show how much in this occasion VKL is indebted to SS´SS. The
618 analysis is the same as the one recalled above concerned with GAD ad BG II.13 vs.
619 SB I and regards the conception of mokṣa in several darśanas. MS, after presenting
620 all the rival views, deals with the view of the aupaniṣadāḥ, the Advaita Veda¯ntins,
621 which he believes to be the highest:
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623
624 SŚSS ad SŚ IV.1 (2005, pp. 640–641) VKL (1962, pp. 8–9)
625 sāṃkhyās tu prakṛtipuruṣavivekād
626 anādyavivekanivṛttau taṃ puruṣaṃ
627 prati nivr
˙
ttādhikārāyāḥ prakṛter na
628 punas tadbhogārthā pravr
˙
ttir iti
629 trividhaduḥkhas-
630 yaikāntikātyantanirodha eva
631 svabhāvataḥ kevalasya puruṣasya
632 kaivalyam iti. pātañjalās tu
633 prakṛtipuruṣa-
634 vivekenābhyāsavairāgyaparipākād
635 yamaniyamāsanaprāṇāyāma-
636 pratyāhāradhāraṇādhyāna-
637 samprajñātasamādhipūrvakāt
638 parameśvaraprasādajāt
639 pañcavidhānāṃ cittavṛttīnāṃ nirodhād
640 eva dharmameghaśabditād
641 asamprajñātasamādheḥ kaivalyam
642 iti kalpayanti. tridaṇḍinas tu
643 jīvabrahmaṇor bhedābhedam
644 abhyupetya
645 jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsād eva
646 kāraṇātmakabrahmaṇi
647 kāryātmakajīvasya
648 karmavāsanāsahita-
649 bhedāṃśanivṛttiru¯palayo
650 muktir iti vadanti. bra¯hmen
˙
a
651 paramaiśvaryen
˙
a yoga ity anye.
652 sarataran˙ganirastaran˙gabhedena
653 samudradvaividhyavat
654 savikāranirvikārarūpeṇā-
655 vasthādvayaṃ brahmaṇaḥ parikalpya
656 jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsād eva
657 savikārāvasthāparityāgena
658 nirvikārāvasthāprāptir eva mokṣa ity
659 apare.
sāṃkhyāḥ tu prakṛtipuruṣavivekāt,
anādyavivekanivṛttau taṃ puruṣaṃ
prati caritādhikārāyāḥ prakṛter na
punas tadbhogārthā apravr
˙
ttir44 iti
trividhaduḥkhasya
ekāntātyantanirodha eva svabhāvataḥ
kevalasyāpi puruṣasya kaivalyam ity
a¯huh
˙
. pātañjalāḥ, tu prakṛti-
puruṣavivekenābhyāsavairāgyapa-
ripākād yamaniyamāsanaprāṇāyāma-
pratyāhāradhāraṇādhyāna
samprajñātasamādhipūrvakāt
parameśvaraprasādanāt
pañcavidhānāṃ cittavṛttīnāṃ
nirodhād eva dharmameghaśabditād
asamprajñātasamādheḥ kaivalyam iti
kalpayanti. tridaṇḍinaḥ tu
jīvabrahmaṇor bhedābhedam
abhyupetya
jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsād eva
kāraṇātmakabrahmaṇi
kāryātmakajīvasya
karmavāsanāsahitabhedāṃśanivṛttih
˙
moks
˙
ah
˙
iti vadanti.
paramaiśvarapra¯ptih
˙
, ity anye.
savikāranirvikārarūpeṇa
avasthādvayaṃ brahmaṇaḥ parikalpya
jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsād eva
savikārāvasthāparityāgena
nirvikārāvasthāprāptiḥ eva mokṣa ity
apare.
660
661 It is clear that MS borrows the entire passage from SS´SS and inserts it verbatim
2 in VKL. The minor differences might be due to manuscript differences and lack of a
663 proper edition.
44 This seems an important modification of the VKL if compared to the published text of the SS´SS. The
editor of the VKL gives in note also a different reading, namely pravṛttiḥ, identical to SS´SS, which is the
correct one, since this reading conveys that once the discriminating knowledge originates in puruṣa, then
prakṛti withdraws from its earlier functions towards puruṣa and does not approach it anymore (na
punas…pravṛttiḥ). I would read accordingly also in the VKL.
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664 II.2.4 General Remarks
665 I started my analysis by stating that any issue concerning MS’s thought has to first
666 be confronted with the content of the AS. In the next sections, I shall show that
667 MS’s originality is enclosed between the brackets of Advaita tradition, where a part
668 of the discussion is linked to fixed textual topoi, and the other part to the intellectual
669 ability of the writer. The works of MS, except for the devotional ones, treat nearly
670 the same issues and thus often refer to each other, so that the above analysis could
671 be easily broadened. In many cases, the very nature of some topics compels MS to
672 use similar arguments and consequently analogous vocabulary. Notwithstanding
673 that, it seems to me that MS rarely “copied and pasted” from one text to another.45
674 I suppose that there are two main reasons for this ability of MS to deal with a single
675 subject in different ways. First, MS pays keen attention to the addressee of the texts.
676 Even though his style is almost always quite vigorous and technical, it has a margin of
677 change in accordance to the aim of the text and to the possible reader. In fact, for
678 example, the style and language of GAD,MST
˙
and BBR are much easier compared to
679 those ofVKL andSB.On the other hand, both of these texts seem a great deal simpler if
680 compared to the intricate technicality of ARR and, even more than that, of AS. In fact,
681 MST
˙
and BBR are texts about bhakti, thus open to everyone; GAD deals with both
682 bhakti and jñāna in very straightforward terms; SB and VKL are considered by MS
683 mere textbooks for Advaita Veda¯nta beginners, while ARR and AS are prauḍha-
684 granthas ‘mature works’ for very advanced scholars.
685 The other reason could be ascribed to his own genius. While keeping his attention
686 focused on the root of the problem, MS has been capable to handle it from several
687 standpoints, each time enriching it with new examples and new vocabulary. We find
688 several clear cross-references in which MS tells us, just like a contemporary scholar,
689 that if someone wants to deepen a certain subject he can glance through another text
690 of his own. Therefore, he willingly does not need to repeat himself verbatim.
691 An interesting example for this practical attitude (no need to spend more time on
692 a subject that has already been analysed elsewhere) is ARR. As stated before, it is
693 quite likely that ARR is the last work of MS, since we find therein references to
694 other works, whereas ARR is not mentioned elsewhere. It refers to AS in dealing:
695 with hearing (śravaṇa, 1917, p. 9; kintu sāṅgaśravaṇavidher eveti vyutpāditam
696 advaitasiddhau); with the nature of the unreal (1917, p. 26; anyathā guṇajanyatvena
697 pramātvāpātād ity advatasiddhau vistaraḥ); with reflecting (manana) and meditat-
698 ing (nididhyāsana) in two passages (1917, p. 24; tadākāratvaṃ ca vṛttiniṣṭha eva
699 kaścid anirvacanīyo dharma ity advaitasiddhau vistaraḥ and 37; upapāditaṃ caitad
700 advaitasiddhau dṛśyatvahetūpapādane). ARR again mentions the same subject
701 pointing out that there is no reason for overextending the discussion therein, since it
702 has been treated in VKL and AS (1917, p. 44; śabdātiriktaṃ cātmaviṣayaṃ
45 An exception to this are the almost identical passages of VKL (1962, pp. 3–13) and SS´SS (ad IV.1;
2005, pp. 634–643), see Sect. II.2.3.
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703 pramāṇaṃ nāstītyādi nirūpitam advaitasiddhivedāntakalpalatayor iti neha
704 prapañcyate).46
705 III MS’s Use of Advaita Material
706 III.1 Doctrinal Milieu
707 Out of BSBh flowed an enormous hermeneutical activity which occupied all the post-
708 S´am
˙
kara Advaita textual developments. In summary, there are three schools of
709 interpretation: the vivaraṇaprasthāna, originating from the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa
710 (hereafter PPV), a sub-commentary on Padmapa¯da’s (IX CE) Pañcapādikā (hereafter
711 PP) on theBSBh; thebhāmatīprasthāna, originating from theBhāmatīofVa¯caspatiMis´ra
712 (X CE), another sub-commentary on S´am
˙
kara’s BSBh, but also heavily influenced by
713 Man
˙
d
˙
ana Mis´ra’s (VIII CE) Brahmasiddhi (hereafter BSi); and, in an earlier stage, the
714 vārtikaprasthānaof the vārtikakāraSures´vara (IXCE),which has a direct bearingwith an
715 indirect gloss and versified version of BSBh: Sarvajn˜a¯tman’s (IXCE) Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka
716 (hereafter SS´).Althoughmanyother commentaries, glosses, and explanationsflowered in
717 both of the main schools, the beginning of the controversy could be epitomized in the
718 double contraposition ofBrahmasiddhi-Bhāmatīvs.Pañcapādikā-Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa,
719 whereas Sures´vara’s school bears a closer similarity with the vivaraṇa one and is
720 decidedly different from Man
˙
d
˙
ana’s position (BSi 1937, pp. xxv–lvii).
721 These three different approaches reached quite strong differences as they
722 embraced a wide range of more important issues of Advaita philosophy: the theory
723 of error (khyātivāda), the concepts of the individual self (jīva), the empirical
724 universe (jagat), the Lord (īśvara), māyā, brahman, mokṣa, and the means
725 (sādhana) to attain mokṣa. The more interesting and more often debated points are
726 indeed the nature of jīva and īśvara, their mutual relationship, and their relationship
727 with the world and with ignorance. The divergences of these interrelated issues
728 show the responsibility for the more philosophically oriented denomination of the
729 three schools: pratibimbavāda for the vivaraṇaprasthāna, avacchedavāda for the
730 bhāmatīprasthāna and ābhāsavāda for the vārtikaprasthāna.
732733
734 prasthāna Founder other name notes
735 vivaraṇa Padmapa¯da pratibimbavāda6
737 bhāmatī Va¯caspati (Man
˙
d
˙
ana) avacchedavāda8
739 vārttika Sures´vara (Sarvajn˜a¯tman) ābhāsavāda closer to vivaraṇa
740741 III.2 Influences on MS’s Thought
742 Through the centuries, the internal polemic between bhāmatī and vivaraṇa
743 upholders touched on very strong points of disagreement.
46 In the edition published by Anantakr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a S´a¯strı¯ (1997 [1937], pp. 859–883) the third pariccheda of AS
has eight chapters, and all of them focus on śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, jñānavidhi and
śābdāparokṣatva. Among these the first four (859–870) are the enlarged version of the ARR passages
mentioned herein.
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744 This internal polemical tendency seemed to decline when several opponents
745 vigorously attacked the divided and vulnerable non-dualistic views. This new breeze
746 shifted the attention towards new investigations (e.g., about Advaita and bhakti instead of
747 jñāna and karman) and gathered all the scattered non-dualistic trends.47 This commitment
748 had two faces: one compilatory and the other argumentative (see above, Sect. I).
749 MS’s AS is truly a vivid example of both these inclinations. Thus, it is a reservoir of
750 quotations from earlier Advatins, whose positions are discussed and strengthened by
751 MS’s lucid logic, his deep exegetic understanding and his precise navya style. The
752 quantity of quotations, references and hints to other non-dualist writers helps us
753 identifywhich of theAdvaita texts and authorsweremore relevant during the period of
754 MS’s personal s´a¯stric training andwhich sources he usually consulted and had at hand.
755 Along with S´am
˙
kara, he demonstrates in-depth knowledge of and often resorts to
756 Sures´vara48 (Divanji 1933, pp. XCII–XCVIII) and his supposed disciple Sar-
757 vajn˜a¯tman (Divanji 1933, pp. C–CVI) as well as to Padmapa¯da (Divanji 1933, pp.
758 XCI–XCII) and Praka¯s´a¯tman (XICE;Divanji 1933, pp. CVII–CVIII),Man
˙
d
˙
anaMis´ra
759 and Va¯caspati Mis´ra (Divanji 1933, pp. XCVIII–XCIX), S´rı¯hars
˙
a, Vimukta¯tman (XI
760 CE; Divanji 1933, p. C), A¯nandabodha Bhat
˙
t
˙
a¯raka (XI–XII CE; fl. 1150 ca., Potter
761 2006, p. 512), Amala¯nanda Sarasvatı¯ (XIII CE; Divanji 1933, p. CVIII), Munı¯ndra
762 A¯nandapu¯rn
˙
a (alias Vidya¯sa¯gara, fl. 1350 ca.), Vidya¯ran
˙
ya (XIV CE; Divanji 1933,
763 pp. CX–CXVII), Ra¯ma¯dvaya (XIV CE), Nr
˙
sim
˙
ha¯s´rama and Appayya Dı¯ks
˙
ita (XVI
764 CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CXXI–CXXII).49 Nevertheless, he seems to be particularly
765 influenced by Citsukha,50 a follower of vivaraṇaprasthāna. Citsukha’s magnum opus
766 is TP. The primary aim of this work is to refute the realistic points of view, be it of the
767 Naiya¯yikas or of the vaiṣṇava types of Veda¯ntins, which were emerging during
768 Citsukha’s period. It seems that the first objective of VT’s NA was to refute TP.
769 In SB, following the ābhāsavāda, MS justifies the view according to which the
770 brahman could be both jīva and īśvara (SB 1986, pp. 42–45). Moreover, following
771 Sures´vara’s line of interpretation, MS replies to the objection that someone should
772 attain immediate liberation once he knows the object previously covered by
773 ignorance. He says that in this case avidyā is not completely nullified but simply
774 overpowered by a mental modification (vṛtti), the nature of which is opposite to the
47 Minkowski (2011, pp. 215–216) writes that the strong division between vivaraṇa and the bhāmatī is
difficult to draw for this era. Although Appayya is said to have been under Nr
˙
sim
˙
ha¯s´rama’s influence, he
writes the Parimala, on the Vedāntakalpataru, a commentary on the Bhāmatī. Nr
˙
sim
˙
ha¯s´rama, on the other
hand, writes the Bhāvaprakāśikā, a gloss on Vivaraṇa, but also a gloss on Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka, notoriously
a text in the Sures´vara line.
48 MS, quoting Sures´vara, calls him vārtikakṛt (ARR 1917, p. 5), vārtikakārapāda (SB 1986, pp. 43, 53;
AS 1997, pp. 556, 558), vārtikakāra (SB 1986, p. 90) or his work vārtika (SB 1986, p. 150), vārtikāmṛta
(SB 1986, p. 40; AS 1997, p. 467). See Divanji (1933, pp. 113–115) and Saha (2011, p. 72).
49 Some scholars accept Appayya to be a younger contemporary of MS. Some others consider Appayya
elder. According to tradition they met each other during the pilgrimage of Appayya to Ka¯s´ı¯, where he
went accompanied by Nr
˙
sim
˙
ha¯s´rama (Minkowski 2011, pp. 216, 223–225). In any case, the dates and the
mutual relationships among these authors are still being debated.
50 The particularity of Citsukha, beside his earlier use of what will later be called Navya Nya¯ya, is that he
treats all the pūrvapakṣas at a stretch and only having exhausted them he replies with the entire
uttarapakṣa. This kind of presentation, usually called mahāpūrvapakṣa, is already used by Ra¯ma¯nuja in
his Śrībhāṣya (thanks to Elisa Freschi for this information). MS, as well as Appayya, quotes Citsukha’s
TP several times.
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775 ignorance related to that particular condition. On the contrary, liberation can only be
776 attained when avidyā is completely subjugated through the knowledge of brahman
777 arising from the upanis
˙
adic mahāvākyas, that same brahman which is the object of
778 avidyā (SS´ I.319). If ignorance concerning a particular object is the antecedent
779 absence of its knowledge (jñānaprāgabhāva, SB 1986, pp. 62–64), then it should be
780 accepted that there are countless instances of ignorance which need to be sublated
781 before attaining liberation (SB 1986, p. 153).
782 MS is an ekajīvavādin-dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivādin (see Das 1977, p. 151), and very near to the
783 vivaraṇaprasthāna’s positions. Nevertheless, faithful to his harmonizing attempt, he
784 tries to defend and justify also those of Man
˙
d
˙
ana Mis´ra and Va¯caspati, to whom
785 sometimes he refers (Divanji 1933, p. XCIX). Having once demonstrated his accord
786 withSarvajn˜a¯tmanandother vivaraṇa thinkers aboutbrahmanbeing the locus aswell as
787 the object ofavidyā,MSalso interpretsVa¯caspati’s viewaccording towhichbrahman is
788 the object/content of avidyā and jīva is its locus (BSBh/B/VK/KP 2000, pp. 2–3). The
789 vivaraṇa followers find fault with mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) in Va¯caspati’s
790 opinion, because if avidyā is responsible for the distinction between jīva and īśvara,
791 it cannot be located in its own effect, i.e. the jīva, which is supposed to be
792 subsequent to avidyā itself: in this way avidyā is located in the individual selves and
793 is at the same time their cause. MS simply affirms that it is not possible to search for
794 a sequence or chronology among avidyā and jīva, because both are without
795 beginning (anādi), and as regards entities without beginning the flaws of mutual
796 dependence (anyonyāśraya), circularity (cakrakāśraya) or regressus ad infinitum
797 (anavasthā; AS 1998, p. 585) cannot be postulated. Similarly, when MS states that
798 only the single individual self whose ignorance is dispelled attains liberation, he
799 justifies also the doctrine according to which there are as many avidyās as there are
800 jīvas (ARR 1917, p. 6).
802803
804 prasthāna locus of avidyā content of avidyā
805 vivaraṇa brahman brahman
806 bhāmatī jīva brahman
807808 III.3 The Definitions of Falsity in the AS
809 I shall now try to show how MS cites, refers to, reads and interprets his Advaitin
810 predecessors based mainly on the first sections of AS, which are concerned with the
811 establishment of the falsity of the empirical world (prapañcamithyātva). In general,
812 Advatins’ texts profusely cite upanis
˙
adic passages, greatly borrowing hermeneutical
813 material from the commentarial tradition from S´am
˙
kara onwards. I will here focus
814 on Advaita independent treatises (prakaraṇa) literature derived from the prasthāna-
815 trayī (i.e., Upaniṣads, BS and BG) and its bhāṣya tradition.51
51 In a useful scheme regarding the citations in GAD, Saha (2011, pp. 370–371) lists all the instances
where MS quotes earlier ācāryas in his commentary on the BG: S´am
˙
kara (upodghāta 1, II.17–18, II.25,
II.41, II.48, II.56, III.2, III.20, III.34, IV.6, IV.18, IV.21, IV.24, IV.34, IV.37, VI.14, VI.29, VIII.24,
XIII.2, XIII.12, XVII.10, XVII.16, XVII.28, XVIII.6, XVIII.12, XVIII.14, XVIII.37, XVIII.66, XVIII.67
and XVIII.75, including both implicit and explicit quotations from the bhāṣyas on BG and Upaniṣads),
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816 The title of the AS hides a polemical vein. Establishment (siddhi), in fact,
817 presupposes the refutation of other’s positions.52 I do suspect that siddhi texts
818 represent a peculiar type of polemical philosophical literature, which is still to be
819 properly researched.53
820 As a matter of fact, MS starts quoting earlier (prācām) Advatins after the incipit
821 of AS where—without acknowledging the exact source—he quotes the well-known
822 inference (prayoga) proving the falsity of the empirical world (prapañcamithyātva).
823 One of the first occurrences of this kind of inference is variously presented in
824 A¯nandabodha Bhat
˙
t
˙
a¯raka’s54 three texts: Nyāyamakaranda (hereafter NM),
825 Pramāṇamālā (hereafter PM) and Nyāyadīpāvalī (hereafter ND):
827828
829 AS (1997, pp. 30–31) NM (1901–1907, p. 128), PM (1907, p.
11) ND (1907, p. 1)
830 evam
˙
vipratipattau pra¯ca¯m
˙
prayoga¯h
˙
—
831 vimataṃ mithyā dṛśyatvāt, jaḍatvāt,
832 paricchinnatvāt śuktirūpyavad iti.
833 na¯vayaves
˙
v a¯grahah
˙
.
sati caivam
˙
prapañco ’pi sya¯d
avidyāvijṛṃbhitaḥ/
jāḍyadṛśatvahetubhyāṃ
rajatasvapnadṛśyavat// (NM)
sati caivam
˙
prapañco ’pi sya¯d
avidyāvinirmitaḥ/ avidya¯to vibhinnatve
jaḍatvād rajjusarpavat//
jāḍyadṛśatvahetubhyāṃ mithyātvaṃ
va¯ prasa¯dhyata¯m/ prāg ukta eva
dṛṣṭānto mithyātve ceha ba¯dhyata¯m//
(PM)
vivādapadaṃ mithyā, dṛśyatvāt. yad
ittham
˙
tat tatha¯.
yathobhayavādyavivādapadaṃ
rajatam. tathaitat, tatas tatha¯ (ND).
Footnote 51 continued
A¯nandagiri (implicit indication IV.6), S´rı¯dharasva¯min (II.41, VI.27 and two implicit indications ad
XIII.12 and XVIII.12), Ra¯ma¯nuja (implicit indication XIII.12). See also Saha (2011, pp. 117–121).
52 The very opening of AS (1997, pp. 8, 14) clears up this attitude: tatrādvaitasiddher dvaitami-
thyātvapūrvakatvāt dvaitamithyātvam eva prathamam upapādanīyam. upapādanaṃ ca svapakṣasādha-
naparapakṣanirākaraṇābhyāṃ bhavatīti “There, since the establishment of non-duality is possible only
after having previously established the falsity of duality, first the falsity of duality alone should be proved;
and this very proving takes place through the establishment of one’s own positions and the refutation of
others’ positions” (See Pellegrini 2014: 4).
53 Nair (1990, pp. 13–17) lists and briefly presents sixteen siddhi texts with an Advaita point of view.
Nonetheless, this kind of philosophical genre is quite ancient and diffused, for example Vasu-
bandhu’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Man
˙
d
˙
ana’s Sphoṭasiddhi, Ratnakı¯rti’s Apohasiddhi and Kṣaṇabhaṅga-
siddhi, Ya¯muna’s Īśvarasiddhi and Saṃvitsiddhi, Udayana’s Prabodhasiddhi, etc. See also the
introduction of Kuppuswami Sastri to his edition of BSi (1937, pp. xxi–xxiv).
54 A¯nandabodha Bhat
˙
t
˙
a¯raka is remembered among Advaita influential writers for his three main works:
Nyāyamakaranda, Pramāṇamālā and Nyāyadīpāvalī. He is believed to be a disciple of Vimukta¯tman
since the latter’s Iṣṭasiddhi I.36 (1986, p. 135) is quoted in PM (1907, p. 4), where the quotation is
preceded by ata evoktaṃ gurubhiḥ. Yet, this is still being debated (Mahadevan 2003, pp. 139–140).
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834
835 Of the three versions of the prapañcamithyātva inference by A¯nandabodha, the first
6 two are very similar and inmetric form,while the third one is in prose. If one changes the
837 metric version into prose, the inference would sound like: prapañco ’vidyāvijṛṃbhitaḥ/
838 avidyāvinirmitaḥ, jaḍatvād dṛśyatvāt, rajatasvapnādidṛśyavat. The PM metric version
839 adds a specification (viśeṣaṇa) to the probans “insentience” (jaḍatva): avidyāto
840 vibhinnatve, “being different from ignorance”. This is to specify that the universe is
841 insentient like ignorance, but it is different from it, because it is its result. A¯nandabodha
842 uses two hetus in theNMand one in the PM.Nevertheless, in the second stanza he states
843 that falsity can be established either through “insentience” and/or through its “being an
844 object of perception” (dṛśyatva). The examples are nearly the same.Nonetheless, inNM
845 he includes also “dream objects” (svapnadṛśya) as a positive instance (sapakṣa). These
846 two inferences, however, correspond to that of the ND, which seems to be the one
847 intended by MS. In fact, in ND’s prose version the syllogism is five-membered, as
848 prescribed in Nya¯ya (NS I.1.32): “The object under consideration [= the empirical
849 universe] is false” (pratijñā: vivādapadaṃ mithyā); “because it is an object of
850 perception” (hetu: dṛśyatvāt); “what is like this [= object of perception] is like that
851 [= false],55 just as the silver [erroneously perceived while one is in fact looking at a piece
852 of shiny mother-of-pearl] which is agreed on by both the debaters” (udāharaṇa: yad
853 itthaṃ tat tathā. yathobhayavādyavivādapadaṃ rajatam); “and so/such [= false] it is this
854 [= the object under consideration]” (upanaya: tathaitat) and “therefore it [= the object
855 under consideration] is like that [= false]” (nigamana: tatas tathā). In this case
856 A¯nandabodha uses just one probans, i. e. dṛśyatva.
857 The left side of the above chart shows MS’s version of the inference. In it, MS
858 adds another probans to those already used by A¯nandabodha, namely “being
859 limited” (paricchinnatva). Also, the example is the same, although the way of
860 expressing it mentions the object of the perceptual error—the silver (rūpya)—along
861 with its locus—the nacre (śukti). This is clearly a slightly re-interpreted
862 representation of A¯nandabodha’s inference. MS then adds nāvayaveṣv āgrahaḥ
863 “There is no insistence about the members [of the syllogism]”. This means that for
864 MS it does not matter how many members the syllogism has and that he possibly
865 refers to the ND formulation of the syllogism.
866 Let us now switch to a very important section of AS: the five (pañca) definitions of
867 falsity (mithyātva), a stock-topic of Veda¯nta since the time of Padmapa¯da and
868 Va¯caspati. All these definitions are quotations from earlier texts. MS acknowledges his
869 indebtedness but defends and interprets these definitions with his own taste. This is
870 evident in the extremely concise passages that MS cites from his predecessors. The
871 importance of the quotation is, at any rate, qualitative more that quantitative, and it
872 stands exactly in the spirit of defence, discussion and re-interpretation which pervades
873 AS. It is not accidental that the first three out of the five definitions of falsity are placed
874 within pūrvapakṣas or very briefly at their opening. This is easily understandable
875 because in the introductory section of NA’s refutation of mithyātva VT refers to and
876 sums up all the earlier understanding of falsity quoting eleven definitions from various
877 sources (NA 2002, pp. 12–13). MS selects only five of these definitions and aims at re-
55 This part of the example corresponds to the invariable concomitance (vyāpti), which could be viewed
as yad yad dṛśyaṃ tat tan mithyā.
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878 establishing their validity. The other definitions, along with VT’s objections, are
879 ignored by MS as, perhaps, obviously faulty or lacking any substantial value.56
880 The original source of the first definition of falsity is Padmapa¯da’s Pañcapādikā
881 (hereafter PP). More specifically, MS replies in primis to VT’s objections and VT
882 quotes Padmapa¯da. In any case, it is likely that MS while refuting VT, had in front of
883 him not only NA, but also the source text that originally hosted the definition under:
885886
887 AS (1998, pp. 48–49) PP (1985, pp. 23, 26; 1992, pp. 42–43; cf.
also 1985, p. 156)
888 na ta¯vat mithyāśabdo
889 ’nirvacanīyatāvacana iti
890 pan˜capa¯dika¯vacana¯t
891 sadasadanadhikaran
˙
atvaru¯pam
892 anirva¯cyatvam.
mithyāśabdo dvyarthah
˙
—
apahnavavacanah
˙anirvacanīyatāvacanaś ca. atra ayam
apahnavavacanah
˙
[…] mithya¯ ca tad
ajn˜a¯nam
˙
ca mithya¯jn˜a¯nam. mithyeti
anirvacanīyatā ucyate.
893
894 Padmapa¯da offers a twofold signification of the word mithyā: “concealment”
5 (apahnava) and “indefinability, indeterminableness” (anirvacanīyatā).57 It means
896 that falsity (mithyā), i.e. ignorance, has the power to conceal (āvaraṇa) the nature of
897 the self and to project (vikṣepa) something indefinable, indeterminable either as real
898 or not-real, just like the universe.
899 At first MS places PP’s definition in the pūrvapakṣa. He reports only part of
900 Padmapa¯da’s statement, skipping over the “concealment” meaning of mithyā, and
901 concentrates his analysis on anirvacanīyatā. Further, he displays his own
902 understanding of anirvacanīyatā: “the property of not being the locus neither of
903 what is real nor of what is not real” (sadasadanadhikaraṇatva).
904 Both the second and third definitions are taken from PP’s foremost commentary,
905 the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa (hereafter PPV) by Praka¯s´a¯tman. The second definition of
906 falsity is undoubtedly the more complex among the five. I have partially discussed it
907 elsewhere (2011, pp. 444–451), so here I shall only show the sources of MS.
908 Again, MS puts forward the second definition (the first one in Praka¯s´a¯tman’s text)
909 just before the opening of the pūrvapakṣa:
911912
913 AS (1998, p. 94) PPV (1985, pp. 174–175; 1992, p. 106)
914 pratipannopādhau
915 traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvaṃ va¯
916 mithyātvam.
pratipannopādhāv
abhāvapratiyogitvam eva mithyātvaṃ
na¯ma, tac ca ba¯dhakajn˜a¯ne rajatam
˙pratipannopādhāv
abhāvapratiyogitayā avabha¯sate iti
pratyaks
˙
am
˙
.
917
918 MS quotes the definition almost verbatim: “falsity is the counter-positive of the
9 constant absence of an entity in the [same] locus in which it is perceived.” The
56 In the pūrvapakṣa Citsukha gives ten options of definitions for mithyātva. VT probably has in mind the
list provided by Citsukha (TP 1974, pp. 56–57).
57 Va¯caspati’s Bhāmatī expresses the same view (BSBh/ RP/B/NN 2000, p. 13).
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920 difference with PPV is just that MS clearly specifies the nature of the absence
921 (niṣedha, synonym of abhāva), qualifying it as “constant”58 (traikālika, synonym of
922 atyanta), while Praka¯s´a¯tman uses the unqualified term abhāva, which, when not
923 further specified, usually means atyantābhāva. PPV immediately applies the
924 definition to the illusory silver wrongly cognized while looking at nacre.
925 An interesting issue appears a few lines further. MS has just defended his
926 interpretation of the definition of falsity through which he is able to negate the
927 nacre-silver example as well as the empirical world in their own locus of
928 appearance (Pellegrini 2011, pp. 444–445). The opponent argues that the negation
929 (niṣedha) of both cannot be by their own nature (svarūpeṇa). In the case of
930 śuktirūpya the illusory silver is negated by the cognition “This is not silver, this is
931 nacre” (nedaṃ rajatam, iyaṃ śuktiḥ) and the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of this
932 negation is not the illusory silver, but the empirical (laukikapāramārthi-
933 ka = vyāvahārika) one, because during perceptual error the illusory silver is
934 erroneously perceived as an empirical one. Similarly, in the case of brahman, when
935 its knowledge arises, the empirical world is negated but the brahman does not
936 contradict the empirical (vyāvahārika) world, which is on an altogether different
937 level, but rather the view that the world has an absolute (pāramārthika) nature.59
938 But, on accepting this, there will be a contradiction (matahāni/virodha) with a
939 sentence written in PPV, according to which the counter-positive of the negation of
940 the illusory silver is that same illusory silver. The problem stands on this sentence,
941 where MS (AS 1997, p. 123) precisely reports what is quoted by VT (NA 2002, p.
942 26). The reference to PPV (PPV 1985, p. 192; 1992, pp. 124–125) is, instead, rather
943 loose:
945946
947 AS (1997, p. 123) PPV (1985, pp. 192–193; 1992,
pp. 124–125)
948 traikālikaniṣedhaṃ prati
949 svaru¯pen
˙
a¯pan
˙
astham
˙
ru¯pyam
˙
950 pāramārthikatvākāreṇa pra¯tibha¯sikam
˙
951 va¯ pratiyogı¯ti.
nanu tarhi ‘pu¯rvam
˙
rajatam abhu¯d ida¯nı¯m
˙
na’ iti ghat
˙
avat kālabhedena niṣedhaḥ
syāt. na,
laukikaparamārtharajatasyātra
kālatraye ’pi śūnyatvāt tadapekṣayā
nirupādhikaniṣedhasiddheḥ.
952
953 In some previous sentences, however, MS quotes verbatim et literatim a passage
4 from TP which contains the same idea expressed by PPV:
956957
58 For this translation of atyantābhāva I rely on Sures´vara’s gloss, see infra in section III.3, after the
Br
˙
UBhV quote.
59 It should be reminded that MS negates the absolute ontic status of the world, not its empirical one
which is established by the means of knowledge. He also affirms that two entities contradict each other
only when they pertain to the same level of reality, not otherwise.
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958
959 AS (1997, pp. 124–128) TP (1974, p. 139)
960 tad uktam
˙
tattvapradı¯pika¯ya¯m—‘tasmāl
961 laukikaparamārtharajatam eva nedaṃ
962 rajatam iti niṣedhapratiyogīti
963 pu¯rva¯ca¯rya¯n
˙
a¯m
˙
va¯coyuktir api
964 purovartini rajatārthinaḥ
965 pravṛttidarśanāt laukikaparamārtha
966 rajatatvenāparokṣatayā pratītasya
967 kālatraye ’pi
968 laukikaparamārtharajatam idaṃ na
969 bhavatīti niṣedhapratiyogitām
970 aṅgīkṛtya netavyeti.
tasmāl laukikapa
ramārtharajatam eva nedaṃ
rajatam iti niṣedhapratiyogīti
pu¯rva¯ca¯ryava¯coyuktir api purovartini
rajatārthinaḥ pravṛttidarśanāl60
laukikarajatātmatvenāparokṣatayā
pratītasya kālatraye ’pi laukikapa
ramārtharajatam idaṃ na bhavatīti
niṣedhapratiyogitām aṅgīkṛtya
netavyā.
971
972 Both MS and Citsukha affirm that there is no contradiction to PPV, because what
3 is meant by Praka¯s´a¯tman’s statement is that the counter-positive of the negation is
974 indeed the illusory silver, simply misunderstood as identical with the empirical one.
975 It does not matter if this silver is negated by its own nature (svarūpeṇa) or
976 absolutely (pāramārthikatvena) (AS 1997, pp. 123–124). Therefore, continues MS,
977 when Praka¯s´a¯tman maintains that the empirical silver is negated, he is taking the
978 negation as a mutual absence (anyonyābhāva) which resides in (= “whose adjunct
979 [anuyogin] is”) the illusory silver (Bhattacharya 1992, pp. 82–84).
980 As stated above, the third definition of falsity also comes from PPV. Also on this
981 occasion MS quotes Praka¯s´a¯tman not literally but, conforming to VT’s reconstruc-
982 tion (NA 2002, p. 37), he displays only Praka¯s´a¯tman’s intended meaning framed
983 into a shorter statement,61 immediately followed by a pūrvapakṣa. MS himself, in
984 any case, is aware of the PPV statement because he quotes it literatim a few lines
985 later, merely inverting the order of the adjectives vartamānena and pravilīnena:
987988
989 AS (1997, pp. 160, 164–168) PPV (1985, p. 178; 1992, p. 108)
990 jn˜a¯nanivartyatvam
˙
va¯ mithya¯tvam […]
991 ajñānasya svakāryeṇa pravilīnena
992 vartamānena vā saha jñānena nivṛttir
993 bādhaḥ.
ucyate—ajñānasya svakāryeṇa
vartamānena pravilīnena vā saha
jñānena nivṛttir bādhaḥ.
994
995 Hence, falsity is that which is contradicted once and for all by knowledge.
6 Whatever appears to be the content of an erroneous cognition and subsequently
997 ceases with the valid cognition of the real nature of that content is false.
998 Just after this citation, MS quotes a passage from Sures´vara’s Br
˙
UBhV (I.1.183),
999 again verbatim, with the two usual “quotation marks”: uktam and iti. This is of course
1000 just an example of the attention paid byMS in quoting Sures´vara.MS cites Sures´vara’s
1001 Br
˙
UBhV several times throughout his Advaita works, and usually verbatim.
60 The edited text of the TP reads pravṛttidarśanālaukikarajatātmatvena, which does not make sense in
this context.
61 I believe that the reformulation of the PPV passage was already well-established by the time of VT,
because we find it in TP’s mithyātvanirūpaṇa (1974, p. 56) and in a slightly modified version in
anirvacanīyāvidyānirūpaṇa (1974, pp. 92, 97), where Citsukha defines ignorance.
Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯’s Way of Referring to Earlier Textual Tradition
123
Journal : 10781 Dispatch : 5-7-2014 Pages : 58
Article No. : 9240 * LE * TYPESET
MS Code : i R CP R DISK
R
EV
IS
ED
PR
O
O
F
1003
1004 AS (1997, p. 168) BṛUBhV I.1.183 (1982, p. 47)
1005 va¯rtikakr
˙
dbhis´ coktam—
1006 tat tvam asy ādi-
1007 vākyotthasamyagdhījanmamātrataḥ/
1008 avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti
1009 bhaviṣyati// iti.
tat tvam asy ādivākyotthasamyag-
dhījanmamātrataḥ/ avidyā
saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti bhaviṣyati//
1010
1011 Here it seems that MS wants to corroborate PPV’s statement, which treats the
2 terms nivṛtti and bādha as synonyms of constant absence (atyantābhāva), with the
1013 stanza of Sures´vara, again reinforcing the idea that the constant absence is indeed
1014 the absence connected with the three layers of time: “Just by the birth of the valid
1015 mental modification arisen from the sentence ‘You are That’, ignorance along with
1016 [its] effect [is experienced as] ‘There was not, there is not, there will not be’!”.
1017 I have discussed elsewhere (2011, pp. 451–455) the fourth definition of falsity,
1018 therefore I shall just briefly see how MS quotes it from TP. MS, unlike the usual
1019 scheme, on this occasion formulates the definition and immediately thereafter shows
1020 its real purport (it is noteworthy that also VT (NA 2002, p. 41) confutes not the
1021 definition but only its purport). In fact, MS does not feel the need to start directly
1022 with a pūrvapakṣa because, due to the extreme similarity of the second and fourth
1023 definitions, the major objections are displayed and replied within the discussion of
1024 the second definition.
10261027
1028 AS (1997, pp. 182–183) TP (1974, p. 67)
1029 svāśrayaniṣṭhātyantābhāva-
1030 pratiyogitvaṃ va¯ mithyātvam.
1031 sva¯tyanta¯bha¯va¯dhikaran
˙
a eva
1032 pratı¯yama¯natvam.
sarves
˙
a¯m api bha¯va¯na¯m āśrayatvena
sam
˙
mate/ pratiyogitvam
atyantābhāvaṃ prati mṛṣātmatā// 7 //
tatha¯ hi—pat
˙
a¯dı¯na¯m
˙
bha¯va¯na¯m
˙svāśrayatvena¯bhimata¯s tantva¯dayo ye
tanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitayaiva
tes
˙
a¯m
˙
mithyātvam.
1033
1034 Evidently, MS quotes ad sensum Citsukha’s metric and prose versions of the
5 definition, synthesizing it into a pure abstraction, without mentioning the “cloth and
1036 other objects” (paṭādi) given in TP’s text. Beside the synonyms used, and beside the
1037 fact that MS’s version is expressed with a compound while both Citsukha’s versions
1038 are more dismembered, MS precisely interprets Citsukha’s point, except for a
1039 philosophically not irrelevant adjective: saṃmate in metric and -abhimatāḥ in prose.
1040 Both these determinations convey the idea that a false entity does not exist, even in
1041 the only locus where it is supposed to be (saṃmata/abhimata). In Vedāntaparibhāṣā
1042 (hereafter VP) Dharmara¯ja Adhvarin (VP 2000, p. 239) writes that without
1043 abhimata there will result the flaw of impossibility (asaṃbhava) in the definition. In
1044 fact, when something is not perceived or found in its own locus it is understood as
1045 impossible. If we add the adjective abhimata to the locus (āśraya), it will result that
1046 the locus is not a real one but just a supposed one under particular conditions. For
1047 example, in the classical instance of the nacre-silver, the only possible locus for the
1048 illusory silver is the nacre, but the nacre is not the real locus of silver because it is
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1049 just supposed to be so in that particular situation. Therefore, from Dharmara¯ja’s
1050 treatment, it seems that something has gone wrong in MS’s quotation. It might also
1051 be that MS recognized a weakness of the definition and therefore focused on
1052 rescuing its intended meaning, rather than its form (whereas at a later time
1053 Dharmara¯ja focused on rescuing the form of the definition by stressing the role of
1054 abhimata-sammata).
1055 Finally, MS gives a fifth definition of falsity taking the idea again from
1056 A¯nandabodha’s ND (1907, p. 1):
10581059
1060 AS (1997, p. 195) ND (1907, p. 1)
1061 sadviviktatvaṃ va¯ mithyātvaṃ. satyavivekasya mithyābhāvasya
sa¯dhyatva¯n na¯prasiddhavis´es
˙
an
˙
ata¯,
na¯pasiddha¯nto ’pi, satyam aba¯dhyam,
ba¯dhyam
˙
mithyeti tadvivekah
˙
.
1062
1063 First of all, in ND formulation the definiendum (lakṣya) is mithyābhāva, where
4 the term -bhāva is a substitute for an abstract suffix (bhāvapratyaya, PA V.1.119:
1065 tasya bhāvas tvatalau, referring to tva and taL). So, interpreting the compound word
1066 mithyābhāva as a ṣaṣṭhī tatpuruṣa (mithyāyāḥ bhāvaḥ) the result will lead to the
1067 identification of mithyābhāva with mithyātva. On the side of the definiens (lakṣaṇa)
1068 we have again two forms: for MS sadviviktatva and for A¯nandabodha satyaviveka. I
1069 believe that these two represent the same formulation. Both are compounds (most
1070 plausibly pañcamī tatpuruṣas: sataḥ viviktatvam and satyāt vivekaḥ) formed by two
1071 corresponding words, but their structures are reversed as a chiasm: in MS’s
1072 formulation the second term (uttarapada) of the compound is an abstract noun,
1073 while in A¯nandabodha the first (pūrvapada). The two formulations are thus
1074 apparently slightly different but fundamentally identical or, in other terms,
1075 substantially MS quotes ad sensum, but essentially he quotes it verbatim.
1076 Next follows the very technical discussion and defence of MS of the three
1077 probans given in his version of the mithyātvānumana. While explaining the purport
1078 and defending the probans “being an object of perception, cognisability”
1079 (dṛśyatvahetu) MS quotes and re-uses Advaitins’ earlier material. The centre of
1080 the discussion is how to interpret the word dṛśyatva, that is, “to have a formal
1081 content” or “to be describable” or “to be a cognisable property”. Here brahman is
1082 excluded because it is without any property whatsoever and, therefore, it cannot be
1083 the content of any kind of cognition. When it is the object/content of a certain
1084 mental modification (vṛttiviṣaya), it is in its conditioned aspect (upahita) and not in
1085 its pure (anupahita) one (Nair 1990, p. 45). For MS, in fact, only the limited and
1086 conditioned brahman can be the object of a vṛtti. The conditioned brahman, as far as
1087 its conditioning adjunct (upādhi) is concerned, is ultimately false (mithyā).
1088 Moreover, while the vṛtti is present, the brahman cannot be unconditioned because
1089 that very modification becomes its upādhi (AS 1997, pp. 239–240). VT cites a
1090 stanza from Man
˙
d
˙
ana’s BSi as evidence that for Advatins also the unconditioned
1091 brahman is an object of a certain cognition, and the meaning of the word dṛśya
1092 applies to it as well. So, for VT the definition of falsity is exceedingly extended
1093 (ativyāpta) so as to include also brahman. MS replies to VT by quoting the same
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1094 stanza in the same way and affirms that BSi’s statement only refers to the
1095 conditioned brahman (upahitapara). MS’s quotation is embedded into the classical
1096 formula na ca… vācyam. It is curious, however, that the three texts (including two
1097 editions of AS) report the passage with very minor differences:62
10991100
1101 VT (NA: 2002, p. 51) AS (1997, p. 240;
NA: 2002, p. 51)
BSi IV.3 (1937, p. 157)
1102 sarvapratyayavedye
1103 ca brahmarūpe
1104 vyavasthite ity
1105 a¯disvavacanavirodhas´
1106 ca sya¯t.
na ca—sarvapratyayavedye
’smin brahmarūpe
vyavasthite iti
svavacanavirodha iti va¯cyam,
tasya¯py upahitaparatva¯t (AS).
na ca—sarvapratyayavedye
vā brahmarūpe vyavasthite
iti (NA).
sarvapratyayavedye va¯
brahmarūpe vyavasthite/
prapan˜casya pravilayah
˙
s´abdena pratipa¯dyate// 3 //
1107
1108 On this point there are some further considerations. MS maintains that in the very
9 moment when pure consciousness becomes the object of a vṛtti it does not remain
1110 pure. He cannot accept VT’s option that the vṛtti becomes its own content,
1111 according to which in its ultimate stage the vṛtti cognises the conditioned
1112 consciousness and, since every other conditioning factor is absent, that limitation is
1113 nothing but the ultimate vṛtti itself. In fact, explains MS, since it is born out of a
1114 verbal cognition of upanis
˙
adic sentences, the final vṛtti must necessarily concern
1115 those words. That vṛtti is the ultimate undivided mental modification (akhaṇḍākā-
1116 ravṛtti) with brahman as its content. This vṛtti, even though it is the ultimate one
1117 (carama), is nevertheless—being a vṛtti—a product of ignorance. Thus, the vṛtti
1118 cannot completely remove ignorance (Gupta 2006, pp. 34–35).
1119 To corroborate this point, MS quotes a statement which he explicitly attributes to
1120 Amala¯nanda Sarasvatı¯’s Vedāntakalpataru (hereafter B/VK), a gloss on the
1121 Bhāmatī:
11231124
1125 AS (1997, pp. 259–261) B/VK (2000, p. 57)
1126 tad uktam kalpatarukr
˙
dbhih
˙
—s´uddham
˙
1127 brahmeti viṣayīkurvāṇā vṛttiḥ
1128 svasvetaropādhinivṛttihetur udayate,
1129 svasyā apy upādhitvāviśeṣāt. evaṃ ca
1130 nānupahitasya viṣayatā, vṛttyuparāgo
1131 ’tra sattayopayujyate, na bhāsyatayā
1132 viṣayakot
˙
ipraves´eneti.
nirupa¯dhi brahmeti viṣayīkurvāṇā
vṛttiḥ svasvetaropādhinivṛttihetur
udayate, svasyā apy upādhitvāviśeṣāt.
tatah
˙
svasatta¯ya¯m
˙
vina¯s´ahetusa¯m
˙
nidhya¯d
vinas´adavasthatvam. evaṃ ca
nānupahitasya viṣayatā, na copa¯dher
nirvartaka¯ntara¯peks
˙
eti bha¯vah
˙
[…]
vṛttyuparāgo ’tra sattayopayujyate na
pratibhāsyatayāto vr
˙
ttisam
˙
sarge
satya¯tma¯ viṣayo bhavati, na tu svata iti
na dos
˙
ah
˙
.
62 MS refers to Man
˙
d
˙
ana again while discussing the probans “limitation” (paricchinnatva), cf. BSi II.31
(1937, p. 72) and AS (1997, pp. 317–318).
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1133
1134 What is noteworthy here is that MS reports B/VK almost verbatim but skips over
5 a few sentences included into Amala¯nanda’s text, only quoting what is essential for
1136 his analysis.
1137 B/VK says that while the ultimate vṛtti cognises the conditioned aspect of the
1138 pure brahman without cognising itself, it becomes the cause (hetu) for its own
1139 withdrawal and also for the withdrawal of other conditioning adjuncts similar to
1140 itself (svasvetaropādhinivṛtti) because that vṛtti, too, is a conditioning adjunct
1141 (upādhitva) which limits the consciousness. Therefore, the unconditioned brahman
1142 is not an object of any kind of vṛtti.63 Moreover, concludes MS, the appearing
1143 connection (uparāga) with the vṛtti is due to the presence of that very vṛtti as
1144 upādhi, and not to the vṛtti being its own object/content. So the vṛtti is not its own
1145 content (svaviṣayaka) but has as its content the conditioned brahman.
1146 At the end of the first part of this section on the probans of the mithyātvānumāna,
1147 MS discusses also a fourth hetu given in TP, namely “being endowed with parts”
1148 (amśitva). Also on this occasion, MS quotes Citsukha’s entire inference. Again,
1149 Citsukha first formulates the inference in a stanza (I.8) and later in prose. MS quotes
1150 ad sensum because again he mixes up some words from the metric version and some
1151 from the prose one. The hetu concerned is amśitva and it is used in the stanza, while
1152 in the prose version the hetu is a synonym, i.e., avayavitva:
11541155
1156 AS (1997, pp. 322–323) TP I.8 (1974, p. 69)
1157 citsukha¯ca¯ryais tu ayam
˙
paṭa
1158 etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogī
1159 aṃśitvāt, itarāṃśivat ity uktam.
am
˙
s´inah
˙
svāṃśagātyantābhāvasya
pratiyoginaḥ/ aṃśitvād itarāṃśīva dig
es
˙
aiva gun
˙
a¯dis
˙
u// 8 //
vimatah
˙
paṭaḥ
etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogī
avayavitva¯t pat
˙
a¯ntaravat.
1160
1161 At the end of this section, MS quotes another inference for proving the falsity of
2 the word. Its author is—according to MS—A¯nandapu¯rn
˙
a Munı¯ndra, author of ten
1163 texts (Yogı¯ndra¯nanda 1992, p. 9), among them the Nyāyacandrikā (hereafter NC)
1164 and an important commentary on Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, the Khaṇḍanaphakkikā
1165 better known as Vidyāsāgarī.64 Unfortunately, I could not trace the inference quoted
1166 by MS in Vidya¯sa¯gara’s main works, which both contain a section on mithyātva. At
1167 any rate, this is what MS quotes:
1168 In this way, it is correct also what has been said by Vidya¯sa¯gara: “The object
1169 under examination apart from knowledge is unreal, because it is not
1170 cognisable apart from knowledge, like dreams etc.”65
63 In one of the sentences not quoted by MS, Amala¯nanda adds that the conditioning ultimate vṛtti does
not cause any other vṛtti to arise (na copādher nirvartakāntarāpekṣeti).
64 NC is mainly a text devoted to reply to the attacks directed to Advaita by Jaya Tı¯rtha’s Nyāyasudhā;
on the other hand, the Khaṇḍanaphakkikā is, as the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya itself, a reply to the Nya¯ya-
Vais´es
˙
ika positions.
65 AS (1997, p. 325): evaṃ ca—vimataṃ jñānavyātirekeṇāsat jñānavyatirekeṇānupalabhyamānatvāt
svapnādivat iti vidyāsāgaroktam api sadhu.
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1171 MS says that this inference is correct. According to him the probandum, namely
1172 jñānavyātirekeṇa asattva, is tantamount to any of the previously given five
1173 definitions of falsity. The probans of this inference, jñānavyātirekeṇa anupala-
1174 bhyamānatva, means that the empirical world is only cognisable if the light of
1175 consciousness is reflected on the internal organ (cidābhāsa) to illumine it. The
1176 cidābhāsa is the appearance of consciousness where naturally there is none; it is
1177 consciousness limited to itself (svāvacchinnacit, LC 1997, p. 325).66 Therefore,
1178 jñānavyātirekeṇa anupalabhyamānatva means not to be perceived without the aid of
1179 the consciousness limited by itself, or better, being different from that which is
1180 illuminated regardless of consciousness limited to itself. For what is independently
1181 effulgent is the self-luminous (svaprakāśa) brahman alone.67
1182 At the very end of this passage, MS alludes to the validity of other inferences
1183 used by other ācāryas without giving any specific reference.68 In this case,
1184 exceptionally, VT does not refer to the inference of NC but rather to two
1185 inferences to the same effect taken from the Vedāntakaumudī (hereafter VK) of
1186 Ra¯ma¯dvaya:
11881189
1190 NA (2002, p. 87) VK (1955, pp. 91–92)
1191 yat tu “vimatam
˙
mithya¯ dhīkāla
1192 evānyathāpramitatvāc
1193 citranimnonnatādivat”.
1194 “bhārūpavastusaṃlagnatvāt
1195 savitṛcchidravat”.
kalpitas´ ca¯yam
˙
pratītisamaya eva
anyathā pramitatvāt
citranimnonnatādivat (91) vigı¯tah
˙
kalpito bhārūpasvasaṃlagnatvena
bha¯sama¯natva¯t savitṛchidravat (92).
1196
1197 The reference is clear. The more obvious reason for the small differences could
8 be seen in these ways: VT had at his disposal a manuscript presenting those readings
1199 or he is quoting ad sensum, or maybe just remembering what he had previously
1200 studied. Although finding a solution is not easy, following the interpretation given
1201 by MS to Vidya¯sa¯gara’s inference, I think that VT used a more correct manuscript
1202 of the VK than the actually available edition. For, I prefer his reading of the probans
1203 of the second inference (-vastusaṃlagna-, “connected with reality”), instead of that
1204 of Subrahmanya S´a¯strı¯’s edition of the VK (1955, p. 92: -svasaṃlagna-, “connected
1205 with itself”). Here, in fact, the texts intend that an inert object only becomes
1206 manifest once it is illuminated by a luminous entity (bhārūpa), which according to
1207 MS is nothing other than the self.
1208 I will directly illustrate MS’s quotation of Citsukha’s definition of falsity in the
1209 caturthamithyātva section (AS 1997, pp. 182–194; Pellegrini 2011, pp. 451–455).
1210 Connected with this is also the total accord and consequent defence by MS (AS,
1211 1998, pp. 544–547) of Citsukha’s definition of ignorance (avidyā) (TP 1974, p. 97)
1212 as a positive entity (bhāvarūpa). In order to establish the positive status of avidyā,
1213 MS quotes (AS 1997, pp. 566, 567) two other TP’s inferences (1974, p. 98):
66 AS (1997, p. 325): jñānavyatirekeṇānupalabhyamānatvaṃ cidābhāse saty evopalabhyamānatvaṃ
hetur iti na kiṃcid anupapannam.
67 I follow LC for this explanation (AS/LC 1997, p. 325): cidābhāsaṃ svāvacchinnacitaṃ vinānupa-
labhyamānatvam, tādṛśacitam anapekṣyaiva yat prakāśate tadanyatvam, svaprakāśānyatvam iti yāvat.
68 AS (ibid.): evam anyeṣām api prayogā yathāyogam upapādanīyā iti.
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1215
1216 AS (1997, p. 566) TP (1974, p. 98)
1217 tattvapradı¯pikoktam
˙
ca—
1218 caitrapramā caitragata-
1219 pramāprā-
1220 gabhāvātiriktānādinivartikā,
1221 pramātvān maitrapramāvat […] iti.
devadattapramā
tatsthapramābhāvātirekiṇaḥ/
anāder dhvaṃsinī mātvād
avigītapramā yathā// I. 10 //
vigītaṃ
devadattaniṣṭhapramāṇajñānaṃ
devadattaniṣṭhapramā
’bhāvātiriktānāder nivartakaṃ
pramāṇatvād yajñadattādigatapramā-
ṇajñānavad ity anuma¯nam.
1222
1223 Here we see that MS’s intention is clearly to quote the inference. The result is quite
4 interesting from an ecdotic point of view, but less so from aphilosophical one.As usual
1225 in his style, Citsukha opens the uttarapakṣa with a stanza, subsequently repeated in
1226 philosophical prose. Nevertheless, the two renderings are substantially the same. The
1227 inference quoted by MS, even though it seems closer to the metrical version,
1228 corresponds to a condensed and simplified reading of both Citsukha’s metrical and
1229 prose formulations. However, MS’s inference substitutes devadatta- (“the valid
1230 knowledge of Devadatta”) with caitra- (“the valid knowledge of Caitra”) in the
1231 inferential subject (pakṣa), and yajñadatta- with maitra- in the example (dṛṣṭānta).69
1232 The subject of the prose version of Citsukha’s inference is slightly more complex:
1233 “The knowledge under discussion risen out of the means of knowledge residing in
1234 Devadatta.” Citsukha’s prose statement is, thus, more precise, insofar as it specifies
1235 that the valid knowledge is the cognition generated by the action of the means of
1236 knowledge and adds a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) to -jñāna, said to be vigīta
1237 (= vivādāspada = vipratipanna) in order to strengthen that this valid knowledge is
1238 the matter under examination. Moreover, affirming that this pramā is located in
1239 Devadatta underlines more markedly the locus-located relation (ādhārādheyabhāva)
1240 between the two members. The probandum (sādhya) of MS’s inference is “to
1241 eliminate [= to be the eliminator of] the beginningless [entity] different from the
1242 antecedent absence of the valid knowledge related to Caitra”. This is quite similar to
1243 both versions of Citsukha’s inference. Another small difference might be noticed: MS
1244 repeats the proper name caitragata- and uses the particle gata- [formally the √gam past
1245 participle] in composition. Citsukha, instead, uses a pronoun in substitution of
1246 devadatta- in the metrical version, while in the prose inference he repeats
1247 devadattaniṣṭha-. He also expresses the notion of absence without specifying, as
1248 MS does, the antecedent (prāk) nature of that abhāva. Moreover, in both Citsukha’s
1249 versions the probandum is not a compound, but it is presented in an analysed form: in
1250 prose, connected with -jñāna, its gender is neuter (nirvartakam) and in verse, together
1251 with -pramā, it is feminine (dhvaṃsinī). MS’s inference also uses a feminine, in
1252 accordance to -pramā. The probans (hetu) is equal in the three versions, only deprived
1253 of the upasarga pra- in Citsukha’s metrical version. Last, MS uses Maitra in the
1254 example and the same wording of the pakṣa: “like the valid knowledge of Maitra.” In
69 Devadatta, etc are all among the most used generic proper names for human beings.
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1255 the metric form, Citsukha places the adverb yathā instead of the suffix -vat in
1256 composition and refers to the quality of dṛṣṭānta as positive instance (sapakṣa). In the
1257 sapakṣa the existence of the probandum has already been established by pramāṇas and
1258 it is universally accepted (avigīta = avipratipanna = saṃpratipanna). The prose
1259 version is just a repetition of the probandum with the substitution of the doubtful
1260 instance relating to Devadatta with the established one of Yajn˜adatta.
1261 MS quotes the second inference at a stretch, but in TP we find it after some lines
1262 of discussion. As evident here the aim of the inference is to establish ignorance as
1263 the material cause of an erroneous cognition (bhramopādānatva):
12651266
1267 AS (1997, p. 566) TP (1974, p. 103)
1268 tattvapradı¯pikoktam
˙
ca—[…] vigīto
1269 vibhramaḥ
1270 etajjanakābādhyātiriktopādānakaḥ,
1271 vibhramatvāt saṃmatavad iti.
prayogas´ ca vigīto vibhramaḥ
etajjñānakāraṇābādhyāti-
riktopādānaḥ, vibhramatvāt
devadattādivibhramavad.
1272
1273 Herein, we see that the difference between MS’s and Citsukha’s inferences is
4 superficially less evident. Although the probandum of the two inferences is literally
1275 different, as the examples are different, the intended meaning is exactly the same.
1276 Citsukha’s inference is analyzable like MS’s. The only difference is concentrated in
1277 the probandum etajjñānakāraṇābādhyātiriktopādānatva and in the direct mention of
1278 the victim of the erroneous cognition, i.e., Devadatta. Here the probandum is a
1279 bahuvrīhi without the suffix -ka. The first part is not etajjanaka- but etajjñā-
1280 nakāraṇa-. In MS’s inference etat means “this erroneous cognition” (etadbhrama),
1281 and also the erroneous cognition is a form of jñāna, a kind of cognition, as stated by
1282 Citsukha. Thus, although MS’s wording is different from Citsukha’s, the intended
1283 meaning of both inferences is the same. The quotation is not verbatim, but seems ad
1284 sensum. However, the differences between the two could also be imputed only to the
1285 manuscript tradition. But this will be made clear in the next steps of this study.
1286 In addition, MS (AS 1997, p. 663) quotes verbatim et literatim a kārikā by Citsukha’s
1287 (TP I.19, 1974, p. 192)70 while discussing and defending another pivotal issue: the
1288 definition of the indivisiblemeaning (akhaṇḍārthalakṣaṇa) arisingout of great upanis
˙
adic
1289 sentences. Another quotation and discussion (AS1997, p. 884) on a stanza fromTP (IV.8,
1290 1974, p. 602),whereMSdoesnotmentionneitherCitsukha’s namenorhisworks andonly
1291 uses the generic formula tad uktam, concerns the true nature of ātman, which is said to be
1292 identical with the eradication of ignorance (Pellegrini 2014: fn. 4).
1293 IV MS’s Approach to Other Schools’ Texts
1294 In all his works, MS displays a considerable acquaintance with several branches of
1295 learning and a great deal of works. Beside the intimate knowledge of Navya Nya¯ya,
70 TP/NP I.19: saṃsargāsaṃgisamyagdhīhetutā yā girām iyam/ uktākhaṇḍārthatā yad vā tat-
prātipādikārthatā// “The said indivisible meaning is the causality of the words towards a valid
cognition free from any relation whatsoever; or otherwise it is their [= tat = of those words] stem
meaning alone.” The same is quoted verbatim and discussed also in VP (2000, pp. 113–114).
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1296 his expertise in many disciplines is evident: dharmaśāstra mainly in GAD,71
1297 purāṇa-itihāsa, grammar, āstika and nāstika darśanas in his other works.
1298 Undoubtedly the Upaniṣads are the first authority for an Advaita writer and so is,
1299 consequently, their direct commentarial tradition. However, MS also widely used
1300 purāṇas and smṛtis, thus elevating their authority. While this reliance is not so
1301 evident in his more polemical Advaita works (such as SB, VKL, AS and ARR), it is
1302 definitely clearer in BBR, GAD, MST
˙
, BPPP and HLV (Nair 1990, pp. 200–201).
1303 Due to the lack of space, I analyse only selected instances. I divide the section
1304 into two parts:
1305 (IV.1) reverse or indirect indebtedness: MS’s reply to VT;
1306 (IV.2) MS’s quotations, acknowledged and unacknowledged references from
1307 other schools’ texts.
1308 IV.1 Reverse Indebtedness: NA and AS on the Definition of Falsity
1309 I have already stressed the point that AS is a reply to VT’s NA. This generates an
1310 “indirect” or “reverse indebtedness”. The indebtedness can, in fact, be twofold: a
1311 direct one, which corresponds to a sacrum furtum where a text or a chapter heavily
1312 owes its philosophical positions, terminology and development to another text or to
1313 a group of texts, usually of the same traditional milieu. Another kind of
1314 indebtedness is that which takes a specific doctrine, a text or a group of texts and
1315 focuses its internal organization and philosophical position on a completion,
1316 rectification or refutation of it. This kind of slightly polemical attitude is what I call
1317 “reverse indebtedness”. In the AS, MS accepts the terms of debate established by
1318 VT and, in putting Advaitins’ arguments into the form necessary for that
1319 confrontation, he slightly alters their structure here and there (Minkowski 2011,
1320 p. 222).
1321 This is the reason why AS is mainly a polemical reply (vādaprasthāna) to NA,72
1322 which, in turn, is basically a polemical text answering to previous Advaita treatises.
71 MS demonstrates acute knowledge and hermeneutical ability on dharmaśāstra issues, which seems
rather unusual for a s´a¯m
˙
karian saṃnyāsin. See, for example, the GAD commentary on BG’s first chapter
until the fifth verse of the second chapter, or again GAD (2005, pp. 711–716). Minkowski (2011, p. 218),
while presenting the connections between the Advaitin of the South and those of Va¯ra¯n
˙
ası¯, plausibly
argues that Ra¯mes´vara Bhat
˙
t
˙
a (beginning of the XVI cen. CE) was the Advaita teacher of Ma¯dhava
Sarasvatı¯, one of the gurus of MS. Ra¯mes´vara established the Bhat
˙
t
˙
a family in Va¯ra¯n
˙
ası¯. The writings on
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ and Dharmas´a¯stra of this family are considered authoritative all over India. So, beside MS’s
strong śrauta background, it might be possible that MS acquired his admirable knowledge of
Dharmas´a¯stra from Ma¯dhava Sarasvatı¯ himself. According to other traditions, the guru of Ma¯dhava
Sarasvatı¯ was the son of Ra¯mes´vara Bhat
˙
t
˙
a, Na¯ra¯yan
˙
a Bhat
˙
t
˙
a, author of the Prakriyāsarvasva, partly of
the Mānomeyodaya and Tristhalisetu. Following this alternative tradition, it seems that Na¯ra¯yan
˙
a Bhat
˙
t
˙
a
defeated Nr
˙
sim
˙
ha¯s´rama in debate (Sastri-Sastri 1959, pp. 47–48). See also fn. 16.
72 On this issue Minkowski (2011, p. 223) plausibly argues: “MS devoted all his efforts to the argument
with the Dvaitins. An explanation of MS’s choice of opponent that might be in keeping with the
contextual suggestions above would be that, in doing so, MS sought to take up an argument about the
conceptual organization of Hinduism as a whole. Through engaging with the Dvaitins, he was attempting
to […] (re)describe Advaita as the position most amenable to providing a “large-tent” theology for the
many doctrines and traditions of Hindus to a word of religious practices and beliefs that were explicitly
sectarian and irreducibly divided.”
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1323 Thus, a “reverse indebtedness” similar to MS’s one might be postulated also in the
1324 case of NA’s pūrvapakṣas.73 The Advaita texts, which initially stimulated VT, have
1325 been identified in PP, PPV, TP, IS, NM, etc. (Nair 1990, p. 20). Although NA takes
1326 earlier Advaita texts as pūrvapakṣas and the answer of MS reflects these Advaita
1327 positions, the very text-to-text controversy began with VT (Nair 1990, p. 20). In this
1328 kind of polemical treatises, the argument and discussions are placed in order to
1329 nullify adversary’s positions, which are usually placed in a pūrvapakṣa. In fact,
1330 according to the rules of debate, a pūrvapakṣa must be somehow re-proposed or
1331 repeated (anudita) before being refuted.74 Madhva’s Dvaita Veda¯nta is obviously a
1332 full-fledged darśana with a deep and wide net of doctrines and texts. Nevertheless,
1333 many of the debates and discussions presented in this textual tradition are written as
1334 a reaction to the Advaitin interpretation of prasthānatrayī. In the maṅgala verse
1335 itself, both MS and VT start by touching the pivotal point of their respective tenets:
1336 VT the reality of the world, and MS its falsity. NA intends to establish the world as
1337 satya rejecting the Advaitins’ mithyātva doctrine by attacking the philosophical
1338 foundation of mithyātva: the superimposition (adhyāsa).
1339 Thus, on the one side stands VT’s conception of the reality of the entire universe
1340 (satyāśeṣaviśva), and on the other side MS’s conviction that the world of duality
1341 (dvaitaprapañca) is false (mṛṣā). MS individuates this falsity starting from its
1342 components/characteristics, the foremost of which is the property of being the knower
1343 (mātṛtāmukha), that are falsely attributed to the self because of māyā (māyākalpita).
1344 Both the texts salute Vis
˙
n
˙
u, but while VT sees Hari as the merciful cause of the
1345 universe and the companion of his great devotee A¯nandaTı¯rtha (=Madhva), according
1346 to LC’s reading MS intends Vis
˙
n
˙
u as “the pervasive essential nature of the individual
1347 self” (LC 1997, p. 2: viṣṇuḥ vyāpakaṃ jīvasvarūpam).
13491350
1351 NA I.2 (2002, pp. 1–2) AS I.1 (1997, pp. 1–2)
1352 vighaughava¯ran
˙
am
˙
1353 satyāśeṣaviśvasya
1354 ka¯ran
˙
am/ karun
˙
a¯sindhum
1355 a¯nandatı¯rthabandhuhariṃ bhaje//
māyākalpitamātṛtā
mukhamṛṣādvaita-
prapañcāśrayaḥsatyajn˜a¯nasukha¯tmakah
˙
s´rutis´ikhottha¯khan
˙
d
˙
adhı¯gocarah
˙
/
mithyābandhavidhu¯nanena
parama¯nandaikata¯na¯tmakam moks
˙
am
˙
pra¯pta iva svayam
˙
vijayate
viṣṇuvikalpojjhitah
˙
//
73 Not only the NA’s pūrvapakṣas are influenced by other texts, but the position expressed by
uttarapakṣas has often the form of quotations, references, restatements and widened discussions of
preceding texts. These could be taken not only for the śruti and smṛti heritage, but also from other texts of
VT, such as Bhedojjīvana, Tātparyacāndrikā; or texts of the Dvaita tradition: Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna on
BS, Jaya Tı¯rtha’s Nyāyasudhā and Vādāvalī, Vis
˙
n
˙
uda¯sa’s Vādaratnāvalī etc. We shall also keep in mind
the acquaintance of VT with other śāstras and his intimate knowledge of Navya Nya¯ya. See Bronkhorst
et al. (2013, pp. 77–81).
74 It is a common rule of the debate that once a debater has expressed his own position, the opponent
should precede his reply by shortly summarizing the adversary’s last reasons (anūdya kathana). This is
done in order to verify that the debaters properly understand their opponents’ positions. If the replica is
not preceded by the repetition (anuvāda) this is a ground for defeat (nigrahasthāna). See also NS V.2.7, 9,
pp. 16–17.
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1356
1357 VT, before starting the refutation of mithyātva, introduces the topic suggesting a
8 few reflections about the nature of the probandum (= mithyātva) and the main
1359 probans (= dṛśyatva) of the mithyātvānumāna. Beside a brief survey on the five
1360 definitions of mithyātva quoted verbatim from Advaita texts, he summarily cites and
1361 refutes some other Advaitins’ opinions regarding mithyātva (NA 2002, pp. 12–13)
1362 and dṛśyatva (2002, p. 13).
1363 The next step is the first definition of falsity. Therein, VT does not repeat the
1364 definition by PP already given in the last lines of the introductory section on
1365 mithyātva (NA 2002, p. 12), but immediately starts attacking Padmapa¯da’s
1366 conception of falsity. He wonders how the word mithyā—as “assertion of
1367 indeterminability” (anirvacanīyatāvacana)—should be interpreted. He furnishes
1368 three options, pointing out that all of them are flawed.75 MS quotes almost literatim
1369 the first two objections by VT. VT, aware of the Advatin interpretation of the word
1370 anirvacanīyatā as different (vilakṣaṇa) from real (sat) and unreal (asat), asks in
1371 primis if it should be read as the absence of unreality qualified by reality (sattve saty
1372 asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvaḥ)76 or if it has two properties (dharmadvaya), namely
1373 the constant absence of reality (sattvātyantābhāva) and the constant absence of
1374 unreality (asattvātyantābhāva); or again, he argues, if it is the constant absence of
1375 unreality qualified by the constant absence of reality (sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati
1376 asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpam). NA (NA 2002, p. 14) refutes all these options. In
1377 the first case, VT says, according to the dualists’ tenets there is a flaw of proving
1378 what has already been proved (siddhasādhana) because they already maintain that
1379 the world is definitely real. The second option is flawed by the mutual contradiction
1380 of the two properties involved. Furthermore, there is the ground for defeat
1381 (nigrahasthāna)77 of proving something other than the intended thesis (arthāntara).
1382 In fac, brahman is also devoid of any kind of property such as sattva and asattva, yet
1383 it is not considered false but absolutely real. Similarly, it could be maintained that
1384 also in the empirical world there is the constant absence of reality and unreality and,
1385 like in brahman, these two properties do not contrast with its absolute reality. So the
1386 Advatin wanted to prove the falsity of the world, but finally proved its reality
1387 (Sharma 1994, p. 19).
1388 The last part of the second objection is wider and more technical. MS refers to it
1389 in a summarized form, just pointing out the more salient tracts.78
75 The third option is similar to the second one, because it presents the same kind of flaws: mutual
contradiction, proving an unintended thesis and weakness of the probandum (AS 1997, pp. 49–50): ata
eva na tṛtīyaḥ, pūrvavad vyāghātāt, arthantarāt sādhyavaikalyāc ca iti cet.
76 A¯nantakr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a S´a¯strı¯ (AS 1997, p. 92) reads VT’s statement in an easier way: tad hi sattv-
aviśiṣṭāsattvābhāvo vā …
77 See fn. 74.
78 MS also reports the last section of VT’s objection (AS 1997, pp. 49–50): śuktirūpye abādhya-
tvarūpasattvavyatirekasya sattve bādhyatvarūpāsattvasya vyatirekāsiddhyā sādhyavaikalyāc ca. Herein,
according to VT, there is the flaw of the weakness of the probandum (sādhyavaikalya). In the body of the
inference the validity of the probandum should be seen in the example (dṛṣṭānta) where it should already
be proved (prasiddha = pramāṇasiddha) by other means of knowledge. The weakness of the probandum
is when the probandum does not occur in the example. In the words “constant absence of reality”
(sattvātyantābhāva) the meaning of “reality” is “unsublatability” (abādhyatva) and its absence is
Madhusu¯dana Sarasvatı¯’s Way of Referring to Earlier Textual Tradition
123
Journal : 10781 Dispatch : 5-7-2014 Pages : 58
Article No. : 9240 * LE * TYPESET
MS Code : i R CP R DISK
R
EV
IS
ED
PR
O
O
F
1391
1392 NA (2002, p. 14) AS (1997, pp. 48–49, 52–55)
1393 (14) ucyate—mithya¯tvam
˙
hi tvayaiva
1394 paks
˙
a¯ntaranis
˙
edhena pan˜cadha¯ niruktam.
1395 tatrādye kiṃ sattve saty
1396 asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvo
1397 ’bhipretaḥ? kiṃ vā
1398 sattvātyantābhāvāsattvā-
1399 tyantābhāvarūpadharmadvayam? yad
1400 vā sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati
1401 asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpaṃ
1402 viśiṣṭam? nādyaḥ, manmate
1403 sadekasvabhāve jagati tasya
1404 siddhatvāt. na dvitīyaḥ, vyāhateḥ,
1405 nirdharmakabrahmavat sattvarāhitye
1406 ’pi sadrūpatvenāmithyātvopapat-
1407 tyārthāntaratvāc ca.
(48–49) nanu kim idam
˙
mithya¯tvam
˙
sa¯dhayate? na ta¯vat mithya¯s´abdo
’nirvacanı¯yata¯vacanah
˙
iti
pan˜capa¯dika¯vacana¯t
sadasadanadhikaran
˙
atvaru¯pam
anirva¯cyatvam. tad hi kim
asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ, uta
sattvātyantābhāvāsattvā-
tyantābhāvarūpaṃ dharmadvayam,
āhosvit sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati
asattvātyantābhāvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭam.
nādyaḥ, sattvamātrādhāre jagaty
asattvaviśiṣṭasattvānabhyupagamāt,
viśiṣṭābhāvasādhane siddhasādhanāt.
na dvitīyaḥ, sattvāsattvayor ekābhāve
aparasattvāvaśyakatvena vyāghātāt,
nirdharmakabrahmasattvāsat-
tvarāhitye ’pi sadrūpena amithyātvo-
papattyā arthāntarāc ca.
(52–55) […] yac ca—nirdharmakasya
brahman
˙
ah
˙
sattvara¯hitye ’pi
sadru¯pavatprapan˜casya
sadru¯patvena¯mithya¯tvopapattya¯
artha¯ntaram—uktam […]
1408
1409 MS refers quite faithfully to VT’s objection and quotes again verbatim the
10 technical terms involved. Yet he presents them in a slightly more improved way
1411 and, to render the reading more confortable, adds one or two words here and there.79
1412 In the second definition VT refers to his comprehensive introduction to the issue
1413 and does not quote the PPV’s definition again but directly proposes his perplexities:
Footnote 78 continued
sublatability (bādhyatva). This sublatability occurs in the example of the nacre-silver (śuktirūpya), given
that there is not the constant absence of unreality/sublatability because the unsublatability kind of reality
is not present in nacre-silver.
79 A difficult case is when, while presenting the first option, VT writes sattve saty asat-
tvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvaḥ (“the absence of what is qualified by unreality, given that it is qualified by
reality”) and MS refers to it in this way asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ (“absence of reality qualified by
unreality”). (A satisaptamī [= absolute locative] employed within a definition has to be interpreted as a
qualifier of the defined entity.) Here, as also shown by A¯nantakr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a S´a¯strı¯ (AS 1997, p. 92), MS exactly
inverts VT’s statement placing the asattva as the qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of the absence of sattva, while
for VT it is sattva that is the qualification of the absence of asattva. However, asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ,
though present in all the editions consulted, could also be a typo for sattvaviśiṣṭāsattvābhāvaḥ. The
commentators follow MS’s reading, apart from Balabhadra’s Siddhivyākhyā (AS 1997, p. 48), who seems
to follow VT.
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1415
1416 NA (2002, p. 22) AS (1997, pp. 94–96)
1417 na dvitı¯yah
˙
, traikālikaniṣedhasya
1418 tāttvikatve ’dvaitahāneḥ.
1419 prātibhāsikatve siddhasādhanāt.
1420 vyāvahārikatve ’pi tasya bādhyatvena
1421 tāttvikasattvāvirodhitvenārthāntarāt.
1422 advaitaśruter atattvāvedakatvāpātāc
1423 ca. tatpratiyogino ’prātibhāsikasya
1424 prapañcasya pāramārthikatvāpatteś
1425 ca.
pratipannopa¯dhau
traika¯likanis
˙
edhapratiyogitvam
˙
va¯
mithya¯tvam. nanu—pratipannopādhau
traikālikaniṣedhasya tāttvikatve
advaitahāniḥ, prātibhāsikatve
siddhasādhanam, vyāvahārikatve ’pi
tasya bādhyatvena
tāttvikasattvāvirodhitayā arthāntaram,
advaitaśruter atattvāvedakatvaṃ ca
tatpratiyoginaḥ prātibhāsikasya
prapañcasya pāramārthikatvaṃ ca
syād iti cet.
1426
1427 Despite the very minor differences of grammatical case changes, here MS quotes
8 verbatim VT’s objections, embedding them in the usual form nanu … iti cet.80
1429 All these were just some clues for understanding how and how much MS is
1430 indebted to VT. Of course, this same iter could be proposed for the entire AS.
1431 Usually at the beginning of every section MS quotes VT almost verbatim, or at least
1432 ad sensum. In the rest of the text, MS sometimes responds directly to VT’s
1433 objections and, on other occasions, his replica has an independent structure and
1434 follows different logical paths.
1435 IV.2 MS and Non-Veda¯nta Material
1436 In traditional circles, MS is honoured with the title padavākyapramāṇapravīṇa
1437 “learned in words (Grammar), sentences (Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯) and means of knowledge
1438 (Nya¯ya)” and, consequently, sarvatantrasvatantra “one for whom each śāstra is as
1439 if it were his own”, because of the really vast range of quotations and references he
1440 uses and discusses throughout his works. I have elsewhere (Pellegrini 2014)
1441 demonstrated how MS used (Navya) Nya¯ya texts and doctrines in a specific way,
1442 adapting them to Advaita tenets.
1443 IV.2.1 Padaśāstra: Vyākaraṇa
1444 It is possible (see fn. 13) that among the disciples of MS there was a certain S´es
˙
a
1445 Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a, probably the Vaiya¯karan
˙
a guru of Bhat
˙
t
˙
oji Dı¯ks
˙
ita. Nonetheless, MS has
1446 been attacked also from a grammatical point of view. In fact, in his commentary on
1447 BG, Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, Dhanapati Su¯ri (end XVIII–beginning XIX cen.) severely
1448 criticized MS’s GAD basing his attacks mainly on philosophical points and on the
1449 “outrageous” contradiction of the commentary of S´am
˙
kara. Therein he attacked MS
1450 in one point (ad BG III.28, BG2 1936, pp. 164–165) also on a grammatical basis,
1451 leaving the idea that MS does not know the fundamentals of such an important
1452 śāstra.
80 For the philosophical explanation of the three objections by VT see Pellegrini (2011, p. 445).
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1453 Despite Dhanapati Su¯ri’s judgement, MS rightly resorts to grammatical
1454 arguments in several circumstances. However, while he directly quotes the
1455 aphorisms of Pa¯n
˙
ini, he rarely quotes grammatical commentarial literature, and
1456 more frequently he just refers to texts, such as MBh with Pradīpa, Kāśikā with
1457 Nyāsa and Padamañjarī, etc. When he happens to quote them, he follows NA.
1458 An interesting case can be found in the second pariccheda of the AS (1997, pp.
1459 460–465), where MS wants to prove the indivisible efficient and material causality
1460 of brahman (abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇatva), whereas the Dvaitins accept the
1461 Lord only as the efficient cause of the universe (nimittakāraṇa) and not as the
1462 material (upādāna) one.
1463 In order to prove that the brahman is also the material cause of the universe, MS
1464 quotes the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (III.1.1: yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante “that from
1465 which these material elements are generated”) saying that the ablative case
1466 (pañcamī) attached to the pronoun yat is prescribed in the sense of a material cause
1467 (upādānakāraṇa = prakṛti) by the pa¯n
˙
inian rule I.4.30 janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ, “The
1468 material cause of the agent of the verb ‘to be born’ [is the apādāna (ablative)]”.
1469 According to MS, the efficient causality of the brahman is already established by
1470 Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.2.3 and VI.3.2, and it is accepted by both the debaters. In
1471 this connection, MS also refers to the third chapter of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra
1472 (hereafter JMS, III.3.14) where six means of proof (pramāṇa) or rules of
1473 interpretation are presented, by means of which the order among actions is fixed.
1474 The first two means are the direct statement (śruti) and the implicit sense of the
1475 words (liṅga). MS can accordingly say that the material causality is also proved
1476 through the direct statement of the ablative (pañcamīśruti) and the sense (liṅga)
1477 implicit in the last words of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad’s (III.1.1) passage (yat prayanty
1478 abhisaṃviśanti “to which they go, into which they dissolve”), which convey the idea
1479 that the brahman is the substrate (āśraya) of conservation (sthiti) and annihilation
1480 (laya) of the universe.81
1481 Following VT (NA, 2002, p. 947), in order to show that the ablative can be used
1482 also for something which is not a material cause, MS quotes an example from a
1483 Vṛtti, namely putrāt pramodo jāyate “from a son originates happiness”. However,
1484 the example is not in the Kāśikāvṛtti (hereafter KV) but in Jinendrabuddhi’s (VII–
1485 VIII cen. CE) Kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikā or Nyāsa (hereafter KV/N; ad PA I.4.30;
1486 1985, p. 191).82
1487 At any rate, this demonstrates to the Dvaitins that the word prakṛti in PA does not
1488 concern a material cause but merely a simple cause (hetumātra). To develop this
1489 position, MS also quotes in a pūrvapakṣa KV/N on the same passage of KV:
14911492
81 AS (1997, p. 460): ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ iti ‘janikartur’ iti sūtraprakṛtyarthavihita-
pañcamīśrutyā ‘yat prayanty abhisaṃviśantī’ti sthitilayādhāratvaliṅgā copādānatvasiddhiḥ, ‘tad aikṣata’
vyākaravāṇī’ti īkṣaṇādyādhāratayā kartṛtvasiddhiś ca.
82 I thank Elisa Freschi for kindly providing me this material.
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1493
1494 KV/N ad PA I.4.30 (1985, p. 191) AS (1997, p. 460)
1495 tatrāsati prakṛtigrahaṇe pratyāsatter
1496 upādānakāraṇasyaiva syāt, netarasya.
1497 prakṛtigrahaṇe tu sati sarvasyaiva
1498 kāraṇamātrasya bhavati.
nya¯se ’pi idam eva¯s´ritya asati
prakṛtigrahaṇe
upādānasyaivāpādānasaṃjñā syāt,
pratyāsatteḥ, netarasya.
prakṛtigrahaṇāt kāraṇamātrasya
bhavatīti prakr
˙
tipadam anupa¯da¯ne ’pi
apa¯da¯nasam
˙
jn˜a¯siddhyartham ity uktam.
1499
1500 Here, MS quotes Jinendrabuddhi almost verbatim. In the first sentence he inverts
501 the position of two words (pratyāsatteḥ and upādānasya). He, moreover, deletes
1502 from the word upādāna the specification kāraṇa and he specifies that if the word
1503 prakṛti is not intended as material cause, then the material cause alone should get
1504 the technical appellation of apādāna. In writing so, he adds the term
1505 apādānasaṃjñā which in KV/V is found two lines earlier, just after the sentence
1506 putrāt pramodo jāyate but not immediately after upādānakāraṇasyaiva. In the
1507 second sentence he writes prakṛtigrahaṇāt in ablative instead of the original locative
1508 and omits sarvasyaiva, which further specifies the compound kāraṇamātrasya.
1509 Immediately after this passage MS, again following VT, quotes Patan˜jali’s MBh
1510 ad PA I.4.30, modifying the original text:
15121513
1514 MBh (Kielhorn 1985, pp. 329–330) AS (1997, p. 760)
1515 ayam api yogaḥ śakyo ’vaktum. katham
˙
1516 gomaya¯d vr
˙
s´ciko ja¯yate.
1517 golomāvilomabhyo dūrvā jāyanta iti.
1518 apakrāmanti tās tebhyaḥ.
maha¯bha¯s
˙
ye ’pi ‘ayam api yogaḥ śakyo
’vaktum. golomājalomāvilomabhyo
dūrvā jāyante apakrāmanti tās
tebhyaḥ’ itya¯dina¯ loma¯dinı¯na¯m
˙
du¯rva¯dı¯n
prati avadhitva¯d ‘dhru¯vam apa¯ye
’pa¯da¯nam’ [PA I.4.24] ity
anenaiva¯pa¯da¯nasam
˙
jn˜a¯siddheh
˙
idam
˙
su¯tram ana¯rambhan
˙
ı¯yam iti su¯tram
˙
pratyakhya¯tam.
1519
1520 I think that here MS did not look at the original text of MBh but simply quotes
21 VT’s statement reproducing it verbatim. In fact, beside Patan˜jali’s statement quoted
1522 by VT and MS about the lack of necessity of this rule (yoga), the first part of the
1523 following question, which is meant to defend the legitimacy of Pa¯n
˙
ini’s aphorism
1524 and without which the sentence “the scorpion is generated from cow dung” could
1525 not be explained, is not quoted verbatim. The second part of the question presents a
1526 minor addiction of “the hair of the he-goat” (ajaloma) in NA and AS, which does
1527 not appear in MBh. The answer, on the other hand, does suffer changes in the
1528 quotation, since VT and consequently MS, interprets Patan˜jali’s synthetic statement:
1529 “These” (tāḥ) mentioned elements proceed (apakrāmanti) from a certain place
1530 (tebhyaḥ). That place or entity from which they originate and then separate is called
1531 apādāna, which can be equally expressed with the aphorism dhrūvam apāye
1532 ’pādānam (PA I.4.24). So, the sūtra I.4.30 is not necessary at all.
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1533 To corroborate his view, VT goes on to quote the opinion of the commentary on
1534 Patan˜jali, Kaiyat
˙
a’s (XI cen. CE) Pradīpa (hereafter MBh/U).
15361537
1538 MBh/P (II, 2006, p. 367) NA (2002, p. 948) AS (1997, p. 761)
1539 yathā bilād dīrghabhogo
1540 bhogī niṣkrāmann apy
1541 avicchedāt
1542 tatropalabhyate tathā
1543 dūrvā apīty arthaḥ
kaiyat
˙
e ’pi ‘yathā bilād
dīrghabhogo bhogī
niṣkrāmann apy
avicchedāt
tatropalabhyate tathā
dūrvā apītya¯di-
na¯vadhitvam
evopapa¯ditam. tad uktam
—s´rn˙ga¯c charo
’vilomabhyo du¯rva¯
gomayatas tatha¯/ vr
˙
s´cikas´
cety evam a¯dyes
˙
v
apa¯da¯natvam is
˙
yate//
iti //83
kaiyat
˙
e ’pi
apakraman
˙
a¯vadhitve
loma¯dis
˙
u ka¯ryasya
sam
˙
bhavatı¯ti a¯s´am
˙
kya
‘bilān niṣkrāmato
dīrghabhogasya
bhoginaḥ
avacchinnatayā
tatropalabdhivat
kāryasyāpi dūrvādes
tatropalabdhir’ ity
avadhitvam eva
tatropapa¯ditam.84
1544
1545 Interestingly, in these passages VT quotes MBh/P exactly verbatim, while MS
6 quotes it ad sensum, slightly modifying Kaiyat
˙
a’s text.
1547 The reason might be that in general MS avoids too technical grammatical
1548 discussions and whenever gets involved with them this happens on safe domains or
1549 whenever he is compelled to do so by the pūrvapakṣin. As usual in India, the sūtras
1550 of Pa¯n
˙
ini are always quoted verbatim, simply inserting the quotation mark iti at their
1551 end. This is probably because it was (as it is today) a compulsory requirement for
1552 traditional students to learn by heart all the grammatical aphorisms. This is a
1553 different case for the grammatical commentarial literature about which MS depends
1554 on VT’s initiative, even though he exhibits his ability to modify its structure without
1555 changing the purport.85 Thus, despite the shortcomings evidenced by Dhanapati
1556 Su¯ri, MS shows a certain confidence with vyākaraṇa as well.
1557 IV.2.2 Vākyaśāstra: Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
1558 One of the teachers of MS was Ma¯dhava Sarasvatı¯, probably a disciple of the great
1559 Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka and Vaiya¯karan
˙
a Na¯ra¯yan
˙
a Bhat
˙
t
˙
a (see above fn. 16, 71).
1560 VKL is mainly intended to explain the true nature of liberation while refuting all
1561 other views. The subject is closely connected with Vedic statements and with
1562 śabdapramāṇa (linguistic communication as instrument of knowledge) in general.
83 Here VT quotes this last passage from Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna I.4.71, referring to KV ad PA I.4.30.
84 Also MS goes on with the discussion referring again to PA I.4.30 and to KV on it.
85 Although there are not as many as could be supposed, in MS’s works there are many grammatical
discussions. Some other revealing examples in AS are concerned with mithyātvaśrutyupapattiḥ (1997, pp.
507–508), brahmaṇo jñātvādyupapattiḥ (1997, p. 753), the quite interesting tattvamasyādivākyārtha-
nirūpaṇam (1997, pp. 832–834) and śābdāparokṣatvam (1997, pp. 876–877); GAD ad BG II.18 (2005,
pp. 94–95); VKL (1962, pp. 77, 80) etc.
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1563 For MS, Bha¯t
˙
t
˙
a and Prabha¯kara Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ are the major authorities on these issues
1564 because, like Advaita, they come from a decidedly orthodox smārta milieu. This is
1565 probably the reason why, though he quotes few Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ passages verbatim, MS
1566 refers to Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas’ views several times, for instance on the function of the
1567 words (VKL 1962, p. 65), anvitābhidhānavāda (1962, pp. 68–69), abhi-
1568 hitānvayavāda (1962, p. 69), the meaning potentiality (śakti, 1962, pp. 73–74) etc.86
1569 More in general, all of MS’s works are disseminated by Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ references
1570 (see, e.g., the reference to the six pramāṇas in the previous chapter). MS mainly
1571 quotes aphorisms from JMS, stanzas from S´V, only a few words from
1572 Śābarabhāṣya, or alternatively he roughly refers to doctrines treated in Tantravārti-
1573 ka (GAD ad BG, 2).87
1574 In order to exemplify MS’s use of Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ material I will focus on a short part
1575 of the first pariccheda of AS (1997, pp. 371–380), entitled pratyakṣasyāgamabādhya-
1576 tvam “Howdirect perception can be invalidated bySacredTexts”.According toMS, in
1577 fact, scriptures can invalidate even direct perception (pratyakṣa). By contrast, VT (NA
1578 2002, pp. 138–139) says that if perception is contradicted by linguistic communica-
1579 tion, the whole Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, Pu¯rva and Uttara will be deprived of its authoritativeness.
1580 That is why Jaimini (JMS I.2.2) opposes the independent epistemologic value of this
1581 laudative passage (arthavāda) “therefore during the day the smoke [arisen] fromfire is
1582 indeed seen, not the flame” (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa II.1.4: tasmād dhūma evāgner divā
1583 dadṛśe nārcīḥ) and this mantra “Aditi is the sky” (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka I.13.2: aditir
1584 dyaur). According to Jaimini they cannot be considered valid means of knowledge
1585 because in both these passages there is a contrast with vision (dṛṣṭi), i.e., direct
1586 perception (pratyakṣa) (JMS I.2.2: dṛṣṭivirodhāt). In order to reply to these points, VT
1587 and MS quote two aphorisms by Jaimini (JMS I.2.10: guṇavādas tu; I.2.47: guṇād
1588 apratiṣedhaḥ syāt). According to these two statements, the arthavāda and themantra,
1589 convey their content with a secondary meaning (gauṇa) or have an indirect
1590 application. In fact, the flame of the fire is not seen during the day because of the
1591 distance from which the scene is observed, while the smoke is seen. In the mantra,
1592 Aditi is simply extolled as everything: the sky, the atmosphere, the mother, father, the
1593 son etc. Ergo, both passages are not lacking authoritativeness because they are not
1594 actually contradicting perception.88 In the same way throughout the string of sūtras
1595 starting from tatsiddhiḥ (JMS I.4.23, tatsiddhipeṭikā) the apparent contrariety with
1596 direct perception of the Vedic passage “The sacrificer is the bundle of [kuśā] grass”
1597 (Taittirīya Saṃhitā II.6.5.3: yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ) has been explained resorting to its
86 Actually, all over the discussion beginning from p. 65 and roughly terminating on p. 95 of VKL, MS is
strongly indebted to Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯’s arguments. In the rest of the texts he mentions Kuma¯rila’s Ślokavārtika
(hereafter S´V) 114 ad JMS I.1.2 (1962, pp. 44–45), S´V 53 ad JMS I.1.2 (1962, p. 130). He quotes also
JMS I.1.5 (1962, p. 68) and a stanza quoted in Sucaritamis´ra’s commentary on S´V 58 ad JMS I.1.1 (1962,
p. 75). Thanks to Elisa Freschi for suggesting this translation of śakti.
87 For example, in VKL (1962, p. 129) MS quotes a few words from Śābarabhāṣya (hereafter S´a¯B) ad
JMS I.1.6; in GAD ad BG II.20 (2005, pp. 97–98) he seems to refer to Tāntravārtika ad Śābarabhāṣya on
JMS I.3.2.
88 AS (1997, pp. 371–373): kiṃ ca parīkṣitapramāṇabhāvaśabdabādhyam api pratyakṣam. nanu—
pratyakṣaṃ yadi śabdabādhyaṃ syāt tadā jaimininā ‘tasmād dhūma evāgner divā dadṛśe nārcir’
ityādyarthavādasya ‘aditir dyaur’ ityādimantrasya ca dṛṣṭavirodhenāprāmāṇye prāpte guṇavādas tu
‘guṇād apratiṣedhaḥ syād’ ityādinā gauṇārthatā nocyeta.
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1598 possessing a secondary meaning (gauṇārthatā). In fact, if direct perception resulted in
1599 being weak or invalid, every perception could be considered useless, because if verbal
1600 proof could contradict it, then there would be no more rule for the dignity of any
1601 expressed concept whatsoever and every one could say whatever he feels, be it logical
1602 or illogical.
1603 What is remarkable in this pūrvapakṣa as quoted by MS is the fact that he,
1604 differently from VT, mentions the six sūtras after tatsiddhiḥ (JMA I.4.23–28) in a
1605 unique string, possibly in force of their technical appellative peṭikā,89 which
1606 conveys their close mutual relation.
16081609
1610 JMS I.4.23–28 (II, 1981,
1611 pp. 313, 322, 323, 325,
1612 326)
NA (2002, pp. 138–139) AS (1997, pp. 371–373)
1613 tatsiddhiḥ// I.4.23 //
1614 jātiḥ// I.4.24 //
1615 sārūpyāt// I.4.25 //
1616 praśaṃsā// I.4.26 //
1617 bhūmā// I.4.27 //
1618 liṅgasamavāyāt// I.4.28 //
… ‘tatsiddhir’
itya¯ditatsiddhipet
˙
ika¯ya¯m
˙
ca ‘yajama¯nah
˙
prastara’
itya¯der gaun
˙
a¯rthata¯
nocyeta.
‘tatsiddhijātisārūpya-
praśaṃsāliṅga-
bhūmaliṅgasamavāyād’
iti tatsiddhipet
˙
ika¯ya¯m
˙
‘yajama¯nah
˙
prastara’
itya¯der gaun
˙
a¯rthata¯
nocyeta.
1619
1620 Apart from the particular quoting mode of MS, the citation is verbatim. Here MS
21 does not only refer to VT to treat the issue thoroughly. The variant readings might
1622 have occurred because MS quoted these sūtras by heart or because he glanced
1623 through one of his manuscripts and found such readings.90
89 The term peṭikā applied to these six aphorisms taken together means “basket, small box, small whole”.
The term is used by Khan
˙
d
˙
adeva (XVII cen. CE) in his independent gloss on JMS, the Mīmāṃsā-
kaustubha (hereafter MK, 1991, pp. 268, 279, 281, 283, 285, 292). Even though I could not find other
authoritative Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas using this term, it seems to me that at the time of VT, and later at the time of
MS and Khan
˙
d
˙
adeva, it was widely accepted. In Mīmāṃsākośa (Sarasvatı¯ 1992, p. 2615) we find a
reference to many groups of adhikaraṇas or sūtras called peṭikā, among which the tatsiddhipeṭikā is also
mentioned without adding any information. Also Pa¯rthasa¯rathi Mis´ra in his Śāstradīpikā (S´D 1988, p. 90)
gives in kārikā form a final purport for the entire context, even though he does not use the word peṭikā:
tad evaṃ tatsiddhijātisārūpyapraśaṃsāliṅgabhūmabhiḥ / ṣaḍbhiḥ sarvatra śabdānāṃ gauṇīvṛttiḥ
prakalpitā //
90 Also, the next chapter of the first pariccheda of AS (apacchedanyāyavaiṣamyabhaṅga 1997, pp. 382–
384) discusses an issue through Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka means. The problem is to deny the difference through the
“interpretative maxim of the subsequent sublating the earlier” (apacchedanyāya) proposed in JMS
VI.5.54 (paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyaṃ prakṛtivat). According to MS affirming that an earlier knowledge
is set aside by a subsequent one means that knowledge produced by direct perception or any other means
of knowledge is later on sublated by knowledge produced by śrutipramāṇa. Before MS, several Advaitins
such as Man
˙
d
˙
ana Mis´ra, Va¯caspati, A¯nandabodha etc., referred to apacchedanyāya in these very terms.
AS, dealing with this same issue, quotes also other JMS, such as VI.5.51, VI.5.55 and Kuma¯rila’s Ṭupṭikā
tasya prayogāntare nikṣepaḥ (Yogı¯ndra¯nanda NA 2002, pp. 149–150; Nair 1990, pp. 54–55; Sharma
1981, pp. 274–275). See also S´D (1988, p. 503).
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1624 IV.2.3 Pramāṇaśāstra: Nyāya
1625 At the beginning of this article (see Sect. I) I tried to reconstruct the steps covered
1626 by MS to master Nya¯ya. Throughout his works we find an echo of his deep insight
1627 into this śāstra, mainly in its Navya form. Apart from the definitely Navya style
1628 employed in all of his works, MS resorts several times to Nya¯ya sources, either the
1629 ancient or the new ones. For example, the two opening sections of AS (1997, pp. 8–
1630 20, 20–48) offer a thorough insight into MS’s intimacy with ancient and new Nya¯ya,
1631 although adapted to Advaita tenets.
1632 In the beginning of AS, MS considers the disagreement sentence (vipratipat-
1633 tivākya) essential to developing a doubt (saṃśaya), which is the basis for
1634 constructing the subject of the inference on which debate is based.91 On the
1635 contrary, VT, together with Navya Naiya¯yikas, does not accept doubt as a
1636 constituent of the property of being an inferential subject or subjectness (pakṣatā).
1637 In the following passage MS refers to the view—refuted in VT’s pūrvapakṣa—
1638 according to which doubt is essential for constructing the subject of the inference
1639 (saṃśayapakṣatā), which in an anomalous way starts with a concessive sentence
1640 (yady api):
16421643
1644 AS (1997, p. 14) TCP (1988, p. 3)
1645 yady api vipratipattijanyasaṃśayasya
1646 na pakṣatāsampādakatayopayogah
˙
.
na tāvat
sandigdhasādhyadharmavattvaṃ
paks
˙
atvam.
1647
1648 In this passage, as well as in the following ones, the confidence, both intellectual
9 and textual, with which MS treats this complex Nya¯ya issue, becomes apparent. He
1650 does not always quote verbatim, but he exactly refers or hints to specific discussions
1651 held in other texts in such a way that once again he reveals his ideal addressee, who
1652 should be able to recall these discussions held somewhere else by means of a clue or
1653 a quotation that is short and right to the point.92
1654 In fact, in the next lines he simultaneously quotes and remarkably summarizes in
1655 a single line the new definition of pakṣatā given by Gan˙ges´a, which in Nya¯ya school
1656 sets aside the hackneyed saṃśayapakṣatā definition:
16581659
91 AS (1997, p. 14): tatra vipratipattijanyasaṃśayasya vicārāṅgatvān madhyasthenādau vipratipattiḥ
pradarśaniyā. See also Pellegrini (2014: 4–9). Accordingly, if one wants to know by inference something
already known through pratyakṣa or śruti, s/he will need, in MS’s view, to raise a hypothetical doubt
(āhāryasaṃśaya).
92 For example, the discussion on pakṣatā starts, beside the four options given in TC itself, from the very
beginning of Nya¯ya speculation. In fact, we already find its forerunners in Va¯tsya¯yana-Paks
˙
ilasva¯min
Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (hereafter NSBh ad NS 1.1.1, 1997, p. 3): nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte ’rthe nyāyaḥ
pravartate. kiṃ tarhi? saṃśayite ’rthe. Some connected passages are also found in NSBh ad 1.1.41.
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1660
1661 AS (1997, pp. 14–15) TCP (1988, pp. 64–67)
1662 siṣādhayiṣāviraha-
1663 sahakṛtasādhakamānābhāvarūpāyās
1664 tasya¯h
˙
sam
˙
s´aya¯ghat
˙
itatva¯t.
ucyate,
siṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtasādhaka-
mānābhāvo yatra sa pakṣaḥ.93
ucyate—siṣādhayiṣāviraha-
sahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo
yatrāsti sa pakṣaḥ. tena
siṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtaṃ
sādhakapramāṇam yatrāsti sa na
pakṣaḥ. yatra sa¯dhakaprama¯n
˙
e sati asati
va¯ sis
˙
a¯dhayis
˙
a¯ yatra va¯ ubhaya¯bha¯vas
tatra vis´is
˙
t
˙
a¯bha¯va¯t paks
˙
atvam.
1665
1666 MS clearly quotes Gan˙ges´a’s definition exactly in Gan˙ges´a’s terms and not in the
7 newly shaped version (as in Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī [NSM] ad Kārikāvalī [K]
1668 II.70), which was also well known by the time of MS, namely siṣādhayiṣāviraha-
1669 viśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā. I think that the structure of the reference, together with
1670 the common training among traditional Naiya¯yikas to commit to memory the main
1671 refined definitions (pariṣkāra) of the system (which lasts even up until today) aswell as
1672 the related discussions, may reveal that MS in this occasion is citing by heart.
1673 Next to this, from anyathā onwards (see next table), in the pūrvapakṣa MS starts
1674 to discuss the flaws (hāni) arising from accepting pakṣatā in the form of doubt
1675 concerning the probandum. The sense of the word anyathā conveys the problem
1676 produced on accepting saṃśayapakṣatā, so the alternative implied by it could be
1677 paraphrased in this way: “otherwise, if we accept this kind of property of inferential
1678 subjectness, according to which the doubt concerning the probandum in the
1679 inferential subject…”. Consequently, MS makes the opponent say that if someone
1680 has realised the self through the teaching of the śruti but desires to infer it, he will
1681 not be able to formulate this inference because he has already ascertained the self,
1682 and so there will be no room for doubt. Additionally, MS here seems to cryptically
1683 and silently hint at the second definition of pakṣatā refuted by Gan˙ges´a in TC (TCP
1684 1988, pp. 42, 55: sādhyakabādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ, “the absence of means of
1685 knowledge establishing the probandum is inferential subjectness”)94 and more
1686 relevantly at the third one (TCP 1988, p. 63; siṣādhayiṣitasādhyadharmā dharmī
1687 pakṣaḥ, “the inferential subject is the substrate whose property is the probandum
1688 which is the object of the desire to infer”).
16901691
93 This is the original definition of Gan˙ges´a siṣādhayiṣāvirahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo yatra asti
sa pakṣaḥ, “the inferential subject is where there is the absence of the establishing means of knowledge
coupled with the absence of the desire to infer”. “Absence” in the latter case hints at the fact that the
desire to infer is not absolutely necessary to infer.
94 This cannot be the correct definition of inferential subjectness because in certain cases the inference
could take place even when there is a positive cognition of the probandum (siddhi).
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1692
1693 AS (1997, p. 15) TCP (1988, pp. 55–63)
1694 anyatha¯ śrutyātmaniścaya-
1695 vato ’numitsayā tadanumānaṃ
1696 na sya¯t, va¯dya¯dı¯na¯m
˙
nis´cayavattvena
1697 sam
˙
s´aya¯sambhava¯d.
na¯pi sa¯dhakaprama¯n
˙
a¯bha¯vah
˙
.
‘śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ
nididhyāsitavya’ iti śrutyā samāna-
viṣayaśravaṇānantaraṃ
mananabodhanāt, pratyakṣadṛṣṭe ’py
anumānadarśanāt, ekalin˙ga¯v
avagate ’pi lin˙ga¯ntaren
˙
a tadanumānāc
ca. ‘s´rotavyas´ s´rutiva¯kyebhyo
mantavyas´ copapattibhih
˙
’ iti
smaran
˙
a¯t. atha sis
˙
a¯dhayis
˙
ita
sa¯dhyadharma¯ dharmı¯ paks
˙
ah
˙
, tatha¯ hi,
mumukṣoś śabdād ātmāvagame ’pi
mananasya mokṣopayogitvena siddhi-
viṣayānumitīcchayātmānumānam.
1698
1699 Regarding the second option, for example, according to Gan˙ges´a, the Br
˙
U
700 (II.4.4.6) passage conveys the idea that when the nature of the self is fully
1701 ascertained from the statements of the śruti, then it could also be proved by
1702 inference. This shows that even non-inferentially known objects can, subsequently,
1703 also be inferentially known. Similarly, according to the third option, the prescription
1704 of the inferential ascertainment of the nature of the self when it is already known
1705 through the upanis
˙
adic statements can be justified. If there is a desire to know the
1706 self inferentially, its verbal knowledge cannot prove to be a hindrance to the
1707 acquisition of its inferential knowledge. The desire to infer can act as a stimulator of
1708 the inferential knowledge. Also, in VKL MS uses Nya¯ya material three times (1962,
1709 pp. 20, 22, 26), mainly from the old school. Interestingly, in the third instance he
1710 quotes a moderately long passage from NSBh ad I.1.2. verbatim (1997, pp. 7–8).
1711 IV.2.4 ARR and Bhedaratna
1712 A final short but due remark on Nya¯ya-Vais´es
˙
ika concerns ARR, which probably
1713 represents the last genuine work written by MS. This text is a rebuttal of S´am
˙
kara
1714 Mis´ra’s (XV CE) Bhedaratna. As stated earlier, BR is mainly a reply to the eighth
1715 section of the first pariccheda, the Caturvidhabhedakhaṇḍana (Yogı¯ndra¯nanda
1716 1992, pp. 96–121) of S´rı¯hars
˙
a’s KKK in specific, and to Advaita in general (Potter
1717 1993, pp. 398–407).
1718 Also in this case, we find a kind of “reverse indebtedness” ofMS to S´am
˙
karaMis´ra.
1719 As it has been shown for VT vs. AS, here MS also responds point by point to the
1720 objections of S´am
˙
karaMis´ra and, therefore, he quotes in his ownway several passages
1721 from BR, introducing them with a very short explanation and closing them with an
1722 analysis and a refutation in his own style. Moreover, as usual in his replies, he
1723 transcends the boundaries of the text on which his rebuttal is based and discloses his
1724 lucid style and logic.
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1725 Just like in NA, this pattern is followed throughout the booklet. As an example,
1726 let us examine the first pūrvapakṣa of the third section entitled śrutīnāṃ
1727 bhedaparatvabhaṃgaḥ (ARR 1927, pp. 39–49; 1917, pp. 3–7):
17291730
1731 BR (1927, pp. 1–2) ARR (1927, pp. 39–40; 1917, p. 3)
1732 dehādes tāttvikād bhedaṃ satyaṃ
1733 cātmany ajānatām/ mumukṣūṇāṃ na
1734 mokṣo ’stīty ato bhedo nirūpyate// 3 //
1735 na sā dhīḥ kvacid apy asti yatra bhedo
1736 na bhāsate/ ata eva na tanmānaṃ yatra
1737 bhedapramāpakam// 4 // tatha¯hi — ‘sa
1738 hovācaitad vai tad akṣaraṃ gārgi
1739 brāhmaṇā abhivadanty asthūlam
1740 anaṇv ahrasvam adīrgham alohitam
1741 asneham acchāyam atamo ’vāyv
1742 anākāśam asaṃgam arasam agandham
1743 acakṣuṣkam aśrotram avāg amano
1744 ’tejaskam aprāṇam amukham
1745 anāmāgotram ajaram amaram
1746 abhayam amṛtam arajo ’śabdam
1747 avivṛtam asaṃvṛtam apūrvam
1748 anaparam anantaram abāhyaṃ, na tad
1749 aśnāti kiṃcana, na tad aśnoti kaścana’
1750 [BṛU III.8.8] iti
1751 śrutānyonyābhāvātmakabhedasyaiva
1752 nañarthatvāt. tathā ca sthūlaṃ yac
1753 charīrādi tadbhinnaṃ brahmety
1754 arthaḥ. evam aṇu yan manaḥ
1755 tadbhinnaṃ brahmety arthaḥ.
atra kas´cid a¯ha, na¯dvaitajn˜a¯nam
˙
muktihetuh
˙
kintu deha¯di-
pratiyogikabhedajn˜a¯nam. vadati ca¯tra
bhedaniru¯pan
˙
apratijn˜a¯pu¯r-
vakabhedastha¯pane prama¯n
˙
am. tatha¯hi
‘dehādes tāttvikād bhedaṃ satyaṃ
cātmany ajānatām/ mumukṣūṇāṃ na
mokṣo ’stīty ato bhedo nirūpyate// 1 //
na sā dhīḥ kvacid apy asti yatra bhedo
na bhāsate/ ata eva na tanmānaṃ yatra
bhedapramāpakam// 2 // ‘sa hovācaitad
vai tad akṣaraṃ gārgi brāhmaṇā
abhivadanty asthūlam anaṇv ahrasvam
adīrgham alohitam asneham acchāyam
atamo ’vāyv anākāśam asaṃgam
arasam agandham acakṣuṣkam
aśrotram avāg amano ’tejaskam
aprāṇam amukham anāmāgotram
ajaram amaram abhayam amṛtam
arajo ’śabdam avivṛtam asaṃvṛtam
apūrvam anaparam anantaram
abāhyaṃ, na tad aśnāti kiṃcana, na
tad aśnoti kaścane’ti [BṛU III.8.8]
śrutāv anyonyābhāvātmakabhedasyaiva
nañarthakatvāt. tathā ca sthūlaṃ yac
charīrādi tadbhinnaṃ brahmety
arthaḥ. evam aṇu yan manaḥprabhṛti
tadbhinnaṃ brahmety artha ityādi.
tatha¯ ca bhedajn˜a¯na¯d eva kaivalyam iti.
1756
1757 Here, as in the case of NA, MS starts quoting, discussing and refuting BR already
8 from the very incipit, the maṅgalaślokas.95 This also demonstrates that in the
1759 traditional point of view upheld by MS, the benedictory verses were already in nuce
1760 expressions of certain siddhāntas (as in NA and AS, see infra IV.1), and
1761 consequently subject to a reflection or a refutation just like the rest of the text. Next,
1762 MS opens the section with a general statement: someone (kaścit) affirms that the
1763 cause of liberation is not the knowledge of non-duality, but a differentiating
1764 knowledge which has the body and other constitutive elements as its counterpart
95 See also the second section of ARR (1927, p. 37; 1917, p. 2) where he quotes and starts his refutation
from the first two maṅgala verses of BR.
G. Pellegrini
123
Journal : 10781 Dispatch : 5-7-2014 Pages : 58
Article No. : 9240 * LE * TYPESET
MS Code : i R CP R DISK
R
EV
IS
ED
PR
O
O
F
1765 (pratiyogika), namely the knowledge that the self is different from the body, its
1766 faculties etc. MS goes on by saying that on this issue this “someone” furnishes a
1767 proof to establish the difference (bheda) preceded by a proposition dealing with this
1768 very difference. From here MS starts quoting verbatim the third and fourth
1769 benedictory verses of his opponent along with the entire and exact Upanis
˙
adic
1770 passages cited by him. Having quoted the long Br
˙
U (III.8.8) passage S´am
˙
kara Mis´ra
1771 explains that all the privative a- compounded with a series of substantives
1772 expressing qualification or attribute are not to be interpreted in the sense of constant
1773 absence (antyantābhāva) but as mutual absence (anyonyābhāva). Thus, a-sthūla
1774 means that brahman is different from the gross body, a-manas intends that brahman
1775 is different from the atomic sized (aṇu) mind, and so on. Here ends the quotation by
1776 MS but S´am
˙
kara Mis´ra further writes a short conclusion in order to clarify the
1777 purport of the entire objection: the final isolation is achieved through the knowledge
1778 of difference and not, as Advaitins maintain, by realising an identity or the non-
1779 duality.96
1780 V Conclusions
1781 This article should be intended as a historical and philosophical reconstruction
1782 rather than a philological one. Although still incomplete, I have tried to show some
1783 of the possible routes for researching MS’s works. I hope to elaborate in the future
1784 the points I could not touch herein and develop the topics I just mentioned in
1785 passing. In fact, MS, even though this tendency seems to be slowly reversing, has
1786 not been studied sufficiently in comparison with his pivotal rule in pre-modern
1787 brahmanical philosophy. First of all, there are some texts attributed to him available
1788 only in manuscript form. Moreover, apart from the untiring effort done in the first
1789 decades of the last century by illustrious exceptions, such as Anantakr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a S´a¯strı¯, at
1790 present MS’s works are not accessible in critical editions.
1791 MS’s knowledge of Sanskrit textual tradition is really remarkable. Throughout
1792 his production he quotes, refers, hints to, and mentions, acknowledgingly or not, a
1793 very wide range of Indian literary production: taken from Vedic lore, along with
1794 Upaniṣads and more common Saṃhitā passages, he quotes also from lesser-known
1795 texts, such as Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka literature. He also demonstrates a deep
96 A chapter apart would require MS’s use of multifarious material from Yoga, Advaitic-Yoga (see also
Gupta 2006, pp. 47–48), and Sa¯m
˙
khya, on the same path of earlier Advaita ācāryas, mainly
Vidya¯ran
˙
yamuni. Even though this is a considerably debated issue, this same tendency of MS has been
seen since the earliest manifestations of Advaita, from the controversial Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa to the
Yogavāsiṣṭha (some would say even in Bhartr
˙
hari) etc. Moreover, this is still present in s´am
˙
karian milieu
where the Advaita Veda¯nta seems inseparably mixed with the cult of S´rı¯vidya¯. Even if MS clears up the
issue that Yoga is not indispensable for the realization of Advaita’s liberation (GAD ad BG VI.29), he
thoroughly uses yogic material while commenting on three chapters of BG, in his GAD IV, V and VI.
Mainly in the VI chapter of GAD he quotes several aphorisms from the Yogasūtra and some parts of the
Vyāsabhāṣya, connecting and interpreting them through the looking glass of Advaita Veda¯nta. Worthy of
mention is also the detailed and long discussion in VI chapter of the seven stages of knowledge, yoga or
jñānasaptabhūmikā (GAD ad BG VI.35–43; 2005, pp. 355–371), where he uses material from
Gaud
˙
apa¯da, Sures´vara, Yogavāsiṣṭha, Vidya¯ran
˙
ya, etc. (see also GAD ad III.18; 2005, pp. 183–185).
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1796 knowledge of epic and pura¯n
˙
ic texts, Dharmas´a¯stra, āstika and nāstika darśanas, as
1797 well as thorough insight into devotional literature. By contrast, I did not see any
1798 quotations from tantric material.
1799 It is perhaps possible to trace a common matrix for certain subjects of debate,
1800 selected quotations and expressions or at least a common methodology, in pre-
1801 modern Advaita texts, which seems to share a common traditional network of ideas
1802 and reference works (see Doctor for the comparable case of Nya¯ya, Sect. 6.1.1)
1803 using similar style, vocabulary, question-answers, quotations and references. This
1804 also indicates that in the intellectual circles there was a common cultural
1805 background and that they shared the same interlanguage (see Freschi, Introduction,
1806 Sect. 3). It should also be remembered that one of the “duties” of the hermeneutical
1807 “living tradition” is to identify the hidden points of a text and analyse them. Hence,
1808 a wide philosophical Weltanschauung is the unavoidable background for any reader.
1809 That’s why unacknowledged quotations were simply be recognized by the readers
1810 (Doctor, Sect. 3.2). Maybe in some occasions only a clue (saṃketa, jñāpaka) was
1811 sufficient in order to recall an entire philosophical discussion for the reader. A basic
1812 knowledge of the doctrines of each school becomes compulsory to take the major
1813 advantage out of this dialogue between the texts and its reader (Doctor, Sect. 5).
1814 This common way of presenting the points of view and argumentations was widely
1815 spread among the Advatins of MS’s time.
1816 In this regard, it is worth remembering that in a traditional śrauta environment
1817 like that of the Advaitins of pre-modern Va¯ra¯n
˙
ası¯, to quote earlier authorities of
1818 one’s own darśana was not only felt as a tool to dignify the work, but also a
1819 compulsory step in order to corroborate one’s own views. Advaitins are often proud
1820 of their direct upanis
˙
adic affiliation and claim for themselves the same non-human
1821 unsystematic structure of śruti. In fact, they claim to stand in a privileged position
1822 within the Indian philosophical panorama, because every other darśana finds its
1823 sublimation in Advaita. The Advaitins believe themselves to be the only legitimate
1824 interpreters of śruti and specifically of the Upaniṣads. Especially in the earlier
1825 phases of the system, the absence of systematic character proper of the Upaniṣads is
1826 transferred also into the commentarial literature of the darśana. This adherence to
1827 the model is seen by the Advaitins as a conscious choice, which, according to their
1828 view, makes Advaita even nearer to the primordial non-systematic character of the
1829 apauruṣeya Veda. For this reason they consider their own point of view a direct
1830 interpretation and sometimes even an emanation of the intellectual peak of the
1831 Veda. According to Advaita every idea is already essentially contained in the Sacred
1832 Scripture, so the hermeneutical ability and introspective capacity of the exegete just
1833 brings a concept to light. Nonetheless, the skill of this exegete is not left alone,
1834 because he is a “ring” of the master-disciple “chain”. The individuality of the single
1835 interpreter dissolves in the impersonality of his own tradition, which Advaitins
1836 regard as beginningless (anādi) and uninterrupted (avicchinna). This, I think, could
1837 be a reason why Advaitins did not feel the need to acknowledge the borrowing of
1838 any ideas from other Advaitins, because for them the unique, true and inexhaustible
1839 source is nothing but śruti.
1840 This is also the reason why in the majority of the cases, it is even difficult to
1841 speak of sacrum furtum, because, as far as MS is concerned, he usually
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1842 acknowledges all the directly cited passages. When he does not mention the name of
1843 a certain author or of his work, he opens the passage with expressions like tad
1844 uktam, etad ucyate etc. or closes them in the most classical way with iti, ityādi, ity
1845 uktam, etc., or similar “quotation markers” (Freschi, Introduction, Sect. 3.2 and 5),
1846 underlining that he is citing from a source that, I guess, should be familiar to the
1847 reader. Furthermore, when MS explicitly quotes, he does so verbatim et literatim.
1848 Conversely, when he refers to some discussion he mentions a certain passage more
1849 ad sensum.
1850 Many of the examined cases are inserted into pūrvapakṣas because MS is
1851 replying to the objections of VT. Therefore, he reports the quotation of the prima
1852 facie view and then, while answering, he gives his own interpretation of the passage.
1853 This is exactly the subject of the last section, where I tried to understand how far MS
1854 is indebted to VT’s NA. In Sect. IV.1 I noticed what I called a “reverse
1855 indebtedness” of MS towards VT, even if I estimate it much less than is normally
1856 supposed. In fact, MS reports NA but not always verbatim. Sometimes he does so ad
1857 sensum, nonetheless usually following the style and precisely using the same key
1858 terms of VT. In these occasions, where we also find the classical formulas na ca …
1859 vacyam, nanu … iti cet etc. several times, he does not need explicit “quotation
1860 markers” because he puts every argument of VT in the pūrvapakṣa and thus leaves it
1861 to the well-trained reader to find it in NA. The replies are independent of VT. Their
1862 striking feature is that MS not only tellingly answers to VT, but simultaneously
1863 defends and harmonizes earlier ācāryas’ views. So, we feel the need of MS to reply
1864 to all the objections of VT on one side, and on the other the independent structure of
1865 his replica, which follows a different logical path.
1866 As for MS’s use of other śāstras, I observed that while dealing with Vya¯karan
˙
a,
1867 Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ and Nya¯ya MS is less attached to literal quotations and just mentions
1868 well-known argumentations through evident references, such as definitions or
1869 discussions on these definitions. His knowledge and re-use of Navya Nya¯ya material
1870 is absolutely perfect, which is probably one of the reasons which enhanced MS’s
1871 authoritativeness and efficacy. He also shows, however, a remarkable expertise in
1872 grammar and Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ from which he uses hermeneutical tools and profusely
1873 quotes verbatim. Interestingly, he very rarely, almost never, takes the name of his
1874 opponent but by quoting literatim from his text he resorts to the cultural background
1875 of his readers.
1876 If observing the contemporary traditional attitude towards research material we
1877 can, at least, extract a pale echo of how MS dealt with the material at his disposal,97
1878 I suggest that in several situations the minor differences are due to the fact that MS
1879 is quoting texts committed to memory. I am also convinced that “behind his desk”
1880 MS had a sensible manuscript library and he was even interested in searching for
97 The entire volume The Pandit. Traditional Scholarship in India (and especially the two articles by
Ashok Aklujkar) is a really useful survey on the figure and the functions of the Indian man of letters. As
for the way pan
˙
d
˙
its dealt with texts, in his introduction Michaels (2001, p. 11) quotes an interesting report
produced by the Sanskrit Commission of the Government of India in 1958: “A Pandit, who devotes about
15 or 20 years to study a particular sastra or a group of allied subjects, generally becomes a master of his
subject. His knowledge is precise and ready; there is no fumbling or hesitancy about him. He does not
need notes, not even books, for expounding the text.”
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1881 and going through rare or unusual texts, as proven by the quotations from
1882 A¯nandapu¯rn
˙
a Munı¯ndra, an important South Indian author nearly forgotten by
1883 Advaita opponents.
1884 Last, MS is perfectly inserted in his period, when innovation was not for its own
1885 sake, but used to widen, deepen and improve earlier tradition, which was still kept in
1886 the highest consideration.
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